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Introduction	
“The	fact	is,	I	remember	them	only	in	my	body.	I	cannot	quote	a	single	line	
from	them,	and	I	have	not	ever	felt	the	need	to	return	to	them	physically,	
thought	I	know	that	I	always	return	to	them	as	I	write.”	
Dionne	Brand,	Map	to	the	Door	of	No	Return:	Notes	to	Belonging	
	
	
This	honors	thesis	will	examine	Sylvia	Plath’s	The	Bell	Jar	(1961)	and	Toni	
Morrison’s	Sula	(1973)	through	the	lens	of	gender,	sexuality,	and	race	using	psychoanalytic	
theory	to	reinterpret	the	bildungsroman.	Juxtaposing	two	mid-twentieth-century	American	
women’s	novels	enables	me	to	displace	the	individualist	definition	of	the	classic	white	male	
coming	of	age	plot	to	center	the	plot	on	women’s	narratives.	I	hope	to	refigure	the	term	for	
an	accurate	representation	of	mid-century	white	and	Black	women’s	development.	I	have	
taken	Diana	Fuss’s	theory	of	queer	“identification”	as	the	starting	point	for	my	readings	of	
both	novels	(Identification	Papers	1995).	My	interpretations	will	focus	on	the	double	and	
the	Black	girlfriend,	patterns	of	violence,	Catherine	Belsey’s	work	on	cultural	ideology	
(Critical	Practice,	1980),	and	semiotic	theory.	
The	male	bildungsroman	emerged	around	the	eighteenth	century	in	German	
literature.	In	The	Female	Bildungsroman,	literary	critic	Pin-chia	Feng	draws	on	Wilhelm	
Dilthey‘s	original	definition	of	the	term	as	“a	linear	progression	toward	knowledge	and	
social	integration,	and	an	upward	movement	toward	spiritual	fulfillment”	(2).	Of	course,	
the	coming	of	age	tale	is	not	specific	to	German	culture	or	to	men.	In	the	British	and	
American	traditions,	women’s	novels	of	development	have	tended	to	act	as	prescriptions	
for	ladylike	conduct.	They	were	subtle	but	potent	indoctrination	of	heteronormative,	
middle-class,	white	behavior	and	outlines	of	ladylike	conduct	as	subtle	put	potent	
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indoctrination	of	gender	norms.	Literary	theorist	Annis	Pratt	suggests	that	early	versions	
of	the	female	bildungsroman	“prescribed	submission	to	suffering	and	sadism	as	an	
appropriate	way	to	prepare	a	young	girl	for	life”	(13-14).	“Life”	in	this	context,	means	
heterosexual	marriage	and	submission	to	men.	The	marriage	plot	thus	became	the	
dominant	form	of	women’s	bildungsroman.	Jane	Austen’s	novels	are	the	most	prominent	
examples	of	this	sort	of	text.	Pratt	contends	that	Austen’s	work	depicts	women	“growing	
down”	rather	than	growing	up	(14).	She	argues	that	nineteenth-century	fictional	
representations	of	women	are	treatises	on	how	women	should	become	objects	rather	than	
subjects,	for	women’s	development	was	stunted	and	regressive.	However,	critic	Susan	
Rosowski,	in	her	essay	on	“The	Novel	of	Awakening,”	presents	the	view	that	Austen’s	
protagonists	are	capable	“of	dual	movement,	both	inward	to	self-knowledge	and	outward,	
toward	awareness	of	social,	ethical,	and	philosophical	truths”	(67).	Perhaps	this	is	the	case.	
Austen’s	heroines	do	‘succeed’	by	the	parameters	of	Regency-Era	England,	attaining	the	
highest	level	of	female	embodiment	in	marrying	financially	upward.	But	Austen’s	novels	
still	outline	the	path	of	respectable	and	economically	sound	matrimony,	not	necessarily	
self-development.	The	marriage	plot	posits	itself	not	as	a	developmental	narrative	but	as	a	
narrative	space	where	characters	make	concessions,	compromises,	and	figure	their	way	
into	economic	comfortability	(Pratt	15).	
Over	time,	women	writers	began	to	move	the	female	coming	of	age	story	away	from	
the	marriage	plots.	The	of	the	“awakening”	emerges	towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	
century	and	beginning	of	the	twentieth.	Rosowski	defines	the	novel	of	awakening	through	a	
“protagonist	who	attempts	to	find	value	in	a	world	defined	by	love	and	marriage”	(49).	The	
protagonist	of	this	type	of	novel	is	typically	a	white	married	woman	of	some	means	who	
	
	 6	
“wakes”	to	the	limitations	of	her	gender	and	her	marriage.	The	character’s	development	“is	
inward,	toward	greater	self-knowledge	and	subjectivity”	which	results	in	a	“revelation	of	
the	disparity	between	that	self-knowledge	and	the	nature	of	the	world”	(49).	The	character	
discovers	that	marriage	does	not	and	cannot	provide	a	happy	ending.	Rosowski	focuses	on	
19th	and	some	very	early	20th	century	novels:	Flaubert’s	Madame	Bovary,	Kate	Chopin’s	
The	Awakening,	Willa	Cather’s	My	Mortal	Enemy,	Agnes	Smedley’s	Daughter	of	Earth,	and	
George	Eliot’s	Middlemarch.	In	a	majority	of	these	works,	the	character	turns	to	suicide	as	
the	answer	to	the	pain	of	being	“awakened.”	Rosowski	comments	on	Chopin’s	The	
Awakening:	“For	only	by	complete	isolation	of	self	can	Edna	be	truthful	to	her	inner	life.	
Any	contact	with	external	reality	threatens	this	dream”	(54).	The	character’s	inner	world	
becomes	incompatible	with	reality,	and	so	in	order	to	maintain	a	loyalty	to	the	self,	she	
must	die.	Protagonists	who	do	not	die,	and	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	twenties	there	are	
few,	find	“resolution	only	at	great	cost.	.	.	she	must	deny	one	element	of	herself”	(68).	Death,	
which	represents	the	maximal	loss	in	these	narratives,	also	presents	the	most	introspective	
act	that	a	character	may	take	within	the	narrative	form.	
In	the	middle	of	the	20th	century,	women	begin	to	survive	their	narratives.	These	
novels	end	neither	in	death	nor	in	marriage	but	by	looking	toward	and	uncertain	future.	
This	form	applies	to	both	men’s	and	women’s	coming	of	age	texts.	The	postmodern	coming	
of	age	novel	centers	on	the	individual,	following	meandering	and	convoluted	narrative	arcs.	
Nicholas	Donofrio,	in	“Esther	Greenwood’s	Internship”	cites	The	Bell	Jar	and	The	Catcher	in	
the	Rye	as	novels	that	“deserve	to	be	read	as	failed	bildungsromans…	because	they	
ultimately	decline	to	narrate	their	protagonists’	passage	into	romantic	and	professional	
maturity”	(241).	Donofrio	also	concedes	that	for	the	female	protagonists	of	Austen,	Bronte,	
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and	Eliot,	“mentors	are	hard	to	come	by,	lessons	appear	more	coercive	than	educational	
and	mastery	is	rarely	achieved”	(243).	To	define	the	bildungsroman	in	such	stringent	terms	
thus	excludes	a	long	history	of	women’s	coming	of	age	texts,	none	of	which	end	neatly	in	
the	independent	adulthood	of	the	male	protagonist.	
By	this	contention,	no	woman’s	narrative	and	more	so	no	non-white	person’s	
narrative,	can	ever	be	a	bildungsroman.	Ideological	constraints	for	young	white	women,	
and	young	women	and	men	of	color	prohibit	ascension	into	“romantic	and	professional	
maturity.”	The	so-called	“maturity”	is	one	only	accessible	to	privileged	white	men.	Donofrio	
does	admit	that	depicting	The	Bell	Jar	and	Catcher	in	the	Rye	as	failed	“is	therefore	to	insist	
on	a	very	specific	definition	of	failure	indeed,”	and	proposes	classifying	The	Bell	Jar	as	a	
modern	novel	of	the	internship—which	is	a	definition	still	limited	by	class	(247).	If	the	
bildungsroman	genre	cannot	even	include	quintessentially	white	male	texts	such	as	The	
Catcher	in	the	Rye,	or	texts	of	white	female	privilege	such	as	Austen’s	work	or	The	Bell	Jar,	
then	the	term	itself	has	failed—not	the	novels.	Perhaps	the	coming	of	age	narrative	should	
not	need	to	follow	the	limiting	linearity	of	Dilthey.	Rather	than	create	subcategories,	the	
shifting	the	definition	of	bildungsroman	to	encompass	marginalized	perspectives	is	
necessary.	Reading	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	as	bildungsroman	within	the	context	of	the	gender	
and	race	principles	which	govern	Esther,	Nel,	and	Sula’s	development	permits	a	de-
centering	of	the	term	from	its	white	male	origins.	
My	de-centering	of	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	also	relies	on	a	reading	of	the	texts	through	
“identification”	forming	rather	than	“identity”	building.	Identity	operates	in	classical	as	is	a	
perceived	endpoint	or	goal.	Identity	is	not	a	plausible	term	for	the	fluctuating	conception	of	
the	human	self.	For	this	reason,	this	thesis	will	rework	the	bildungsroman	along	the	lines	of	
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the	“identification”	theory	first	employed	by	Sigmund	Freud	and	later	appropriated	by	
Diana	Fuss	in	her	text	Identification	Papers	(1995).	
Identification	more	accurately	describes	the	ongoing	process	of	self-creation	in	the	
individual	as	a	subject.	Where	identity	is	constructed	on	the	basis	of	“facts”	about	the	self,	
identification	arrives	on	the	basis	of	relations	to	external	experiences.	Fuss	defines	
identification	as	“the	psychical	mechanism	that	produces	self-recognition”	and	the	process	
which	“inhabits,	organizes,	instantiates	identity”	(2).	She	analyzes	and	reworks	Freud	to	
produce	a	more	socially	accurate	definition	based	in	queer	theory	and	avoids	Freud’s	more	
homophobic,	misogynistic,	and	racist	pitfalls.	Freud	bases	his	identification	theory	upon	an	
assumption	of	gender	and	sexual	binary,	which	Fuss	distinguishes	as	“identification	(the	
wish	to	be	the	other)	from	sexual	object-choice	(the	wish	to	have	the	other)”	along	the	lines	
of	a	male/female	dichotomy	(11).	In	a	world	where	sexuality	and	gender	are	far	more	
complex	than	Freud	ever	could	have	predicted,	identification	based	on	a	binary	is	not	a	
reasonable	explanation.	Such	a	binary	pathologizes	homosexuality	as	confused	“wish	to	be	
other”	(to	be	like	someone	of	the	same	gender)	rather	than	“wish	to	have	other”	(wish	to	
have	sex	with	someone	of	the	same	gender).	The	subject’s	desire	for	one	sex	can	only	be	
secured	through	a	corresponding	identification	with	the	other	sex,	coexistence	of	the	two	
“would	be	a	logical	impossibility	for	Freud”	(67).	As	a	foundational	assumption,	it	is	of	
course	a	tenuous	one	at	best.	On	the	basis	of	queer	theory,	Fuss	problematizes	this	
assumption	and	postulates	that	the	two	concepts	may	be	entangled,	if	not	one	and	the	same	
(11).	This	interpretation	of	identification	deconstructs	Freud’s	rigid	gender	binary	and	his	
reasoning	for	pathologizing	homosexuality.	According	to	Fuss,	all	desires	are	mixed	with	
identifications,	and	all	identifications	are	somewhat	desirous.	She	understands	desire	as	
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instrumental	in	the	creation	of	self	and	subjectivity.	Identification	follows	the	logical	
transference	of	“she	is	X,	therefore	I	am	X”	as	persisting	to,	“she	is	X,	I	desire	her,	therefore	I	
am	also	X.”	If	“identification	is	the	mechanism	Freud	summons	to	keep	desire	from	
overflowing	its	socially	sanctioned	borders;”	then	it	is	the	mechanism	that	permits	the	
reading	of	female	protagonists’	development	(45).	Aligning	identification	with	queer	desire	
de-centers	the	developmental	plot	of	the	bildungsroman	from	its	heterosexual	origins.	
In	seeking	to	use	identification	as	a	means	of	understanding	and	interrogating	the	
women’s	bildungsroman,	this	thesis	will	integrate	psychoanalytic	readings	of	race	and	
queerness	in	the	texts	with	specific	emphasis	on	“ideology”	in	literature.	Ideology	is	the	
grounding	space	of	human	psychology	and	social	phenomena	which	both	questions	and	
substantiates	the	discourse	of	a	text.	British	literary	critic	Catherine	Belsey,	in	Critical	
Practice,	draws	on	the	work	of	Louis	Althusser	to	define	literary	ideology	as	producing	“the	
relations	of	production,	the	social	relationships	which	are	the	necessary	condition	for	the	
existence	and	perpetuation	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production”	(56).	Ideology	is	the	
human	symbol	system	of	linguistics	which	describes	human	relationships	between	self	and	
world,	self	and	community,	self	and	other,	the	“condition	of	the	action,”	which	produces	
“identification	with	the	‘I’	of	the	discourse”	(62).	Ideology	coerces	the	writer	into	
perpetuating	and	engaging	with	it.	Divorcing	literature	from	ideology	is	therefore	an	
insurmountable	and	useless	task.	It	is	the	work	of	the	critic	to	dig	through	a	text	to	discover	
ideology.	But	reading	for	ideology	is	not	the	same	as	reading	for	intent.	Rather,	the	process	
of	analyzing	ideology	“is	not	inevitable,	in	the	sense	that	texts	do	not	determine	like	fate	the	
way	in	which	they	must	be	read”	(69).	Although	ideology	informs	a	reading,	it	does	not	
mandate	it.	The	meaning	making	of	literature	is	an	ever-fluid	process	of	exchange	between	
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reader,	author,	and	language.	Perhaps	this	sounds	familiar—the	work	of	reading	is	itself	a	
work	of	identification	between	reader	and	text.	
Therefore,	Belsey	calls	for	the	reader	to	pay	close	attention	to	the	“conventional”	
ideology	of	texts.	She	states	that	she	is	“concerned	at	this	stage	primarily	with	ways	in	
which	they	are	conventionally	read”	and	how	meaning	can	be	lifted	from	them	(69).	In	
general,	a	text	will	refer	to	a	conventional	ideology,	because	a	specific	person	in	a	specific	
context	wrote	the	text.	Belsey	provides	the	(apt	for	the	purposes	of	this	project)	example	of	
“women	as	a	group”	who,	in	the	context	of	dominant	culture,	“are	both	produced	and	
inhibited	by	contradictory	discourses”	(65).	This	unmarked	“woman”	of	Belsey’s	
participates	in	both	“the	liberal	humanist	discourse	of	freedom,	self-determination	and	
rationality”	and	also	“the	specifically	feminine	discourse	offered	by	society	of	submission,	
relative	inadequacy	and	irrational	intuition”	(65).	She	does	clarify	that	a	generalization	as	
such	is	quite	broad,	and	although	it	is	a	summary	of	the	demands	of	womanhood—she	is	
not	entirely	wrong.	Most	individuals	reflect	the	intersection	of	a	number	of	contradictory	
discourses	that	produce	the	ideology	by	which	they	live.	Ideology	is	always	present	in	the	
text,	always	producing	and	obscuring	meaning.	Reading	becomes	a	matter	of	excavation	
through	layers	of	ideology	and	language	to	determine	what	work	a	text	does,	what	cultural	
significance	it	produces.	
Reading	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	both	within	and	against	their	respective	ideologies	is	
crucial	to	a	sensitive	and	thorough	analysis.	As	a	white	twenty-first-century	woman	
performing	a	reading	of	texts	outside	the	dominant	ideology	of	my	own	time	and	race,	
deference	to	ideology	and	background	historical	content	is	necessary.	This	permits	a	
reading	that	derives	not	from	my	personal	positionality,	but	from	my	training	in	careful	
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reading	and	my	education	in	English	critical	analysis.	Valerie	Smith,	in	“Black	Feminist	
Theory	and	the	Representation	of	the	‘Other’,”	describes	the	term	“black	feminist	theory”	as	
not	dependent	on	the	positionality	of	the	theorist,	but	“a	way	of	reading	inscriptions	of	race	
(particularly	but	not	exclusively	blackness),	gender	(particularly	but	not	exclusively	
womanhood),	and”	particularly	the	middle	“class	in	modes	of	cultural	expression”	(370).	
Reading	texts	with	Black	feminist	theory	or	with	attention	to	the	intersectionality	of	race	
and	gender	is	a	process	of	educated	analysis.	With	this	reasoning,	despite	my	personal	
positionality,	I	hope	to	read	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	in	terms	of	their	race,	gender,	and	class	
inscriptions	in	accordance	with	their	historical	contexts.	I	hope	to	discern	how	both	
support	and	resist	their	dominant	ideologies	within	and	outside	of	to	their	dominant	
ideologies.	
	 Sylvia	Plath’s	The	Bell	Jar	was	first	published	in	1963	under	the	pseudonym	
“Victoria	Lucas,”	exclusively	in	the	United	Kingdom,	and	just	months	before	Plath’s	suicide.	
It	wasn’t	released	in	the	United	States	until	1971.	The	book	garnered	attention	due	to	its	
obvious	basis	in	autobiography	and	the	pre-existing	sensation	of	her	suicide.	The	
protagonist,	Esther	Greenwood,	is	a	white,	middle	class,	nineteen-year-old	girl	from	an	
unnamed	suburb	of	Boston,	Massachusetts,	whose	story	and	biography	closely	mirrors	the	
events	of	Plath’s	life	and	background.	Plath’s	life	allows	for	some	degree	of	assumption	
about	Esther.	Where	the	text	is	vague,	it	is	easy	to	determine	where	Plath	is	drawing	from	
in	her	autobiography,	which	makes	a	reading	based	in	Plath’s	life	tempting.	Jacqueline	
Rose,	in	The	Haunting	of	Sylvia	Plath,	suggests	that	Plath’s	famous	suicide	“engenders	a	
literary	movement	constituted	in	the	very	image	of	her	death”	which	either	“destroys	the	
culture”	or	operates	as	“the	precondition	for	the	culture	to	survive”	(23).	Often	for	readers,	
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her	death	either	substantiates	the	meaning	of	her	texts,	or	ruins	it	by	obscuring	the	
impressiveness	of	her	writing	in	autobiography.	Tomasz	Fisiak	characterizes	the	novel	as	a	
“feminist	autobiography”	in	his	work	“Feminist	Auto/biography	as	a	Means	of	Empowering	
Women”:	“The	usage	of	the	auto/biographical	mode	is	just	one	of	the	main	components	to	
gain	autonomy	through	writing…	To	liberate	one’s	voice,	the	author	creates	a	distinct	
written	self	(fictive	or	not)	that	gains	control	over	her	production”	(190).	Fisiak’s	alarming	
commentary	pays	no	notice	to	the	fact	that	The	Bell	Jar	is	deliberately	categorized	as	a	
piece	of	fiction.	Thirty	years	earlier,	critic	Henry	Schevy	called	for	a	separation	of	Plath	
from	her	text,	calling	it	an	“almost	impossible	task”	of	saving	“the	tale	from	the	Plath	cult	
which	threatens	to	obscure	the	quality	of	the	writing	with	biographical	detail”	(18).	Plath’s	
intent	is	not	unimportant,	but	in	the	case	of	a	text	which	autobiographical	reading	is	so	
easy	and	so	damaging,	it	should	be	treated	with	great	delicacy.	Rather,	the	cultural	and	
ideological	context	should	be	afforded	more	attention.	
A	holistic	understanding	of	1950s	ideology	per	Belsey’s	suggestion	is	necessary	in	
order	to	parse	the	meaning	making	of	The	Bell	Jar.	Linda	Wagner-Martin,	in	The	Bell	Jar:	A	
Novel	of	the	Fifties,	turns	to	Plath’s	political	ideals	to	contextualize	the	novel,	“She	voted	for	
Adlai	Stevenson	(though	her	mother	voted	for	Eisenhower)	and	lamented	the	
McCarthyism,	isolationism,	and	conservatism	that	had	become	pervasive	American	
attitudes”	(5).	The	politics	of	both	Plath	and	the	fifties	situate	The	Bell	Jar	as	pushing	
against	the	constraints	of	culture	and	questioning	the	role	that	a	(white)	woman	can	play	in	
American	society.	Wagner-Martin’s	remark	that	“the	assumption	was	that	every	person	
alive	was	heterosexual,	and	the	birthrate	rose	incredibly”	during	the	decade	in	question,	is	
also	quite	potent	in	light	of	a	reading	which	factors	queer	desire	into	the	text	(5).	This	is	
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partially	what	makes	Esther	such	an	interesting	albeit	greatly	flawed	character.	Esther	
stands	outside	of	1950s	heterosexual	ideology	by	avoiding	marriage,	engaging	in	extra-
marital	sex,	and	pursuing	a	career	in	writing.	At	the	same,	she	is	privileged,	petulant,	and	
racist	in	a	number	of	instances	across	the	novel.	The	Bell	Jar	is	progressive	for	illustrating	a	
young	woman	who	breaks	the	mold	of	white	feminine	norms,	but	it	is	regressive	in	the	
ways	that	it	does	not.	This	reading	will	thus	examine	how	much	Esther’s	identification	
centers	on	her	whiteness	and	her	privilege.	I	will	seek	to	consider	both	the	successes	and	
the	shortcomings	of	the	text	in	thereby	de-centering	the	bildungsroman	by	reading	Esther	
as	a	character	simultaneously	resistant	and	loyal	to	her	ideological	context.	
	 Sula	(1973)	is	Toni	Morrison’s	second	novel.	The	text	follows	the	development	of	
two	young	Black	girls	in	the	“Bottom”	a	neighborhood	in	the	fictional	town	of	Medallion,	
Ohio.	Sula	escapes	the	ascription	of	authorial	intent	readings.	But	as	a	Black	as	well	as	
female	writer,	Morrison	falls	under	a	different	sort	of	scrutiny,	described	in	a	quote	by	Alice	
Godfrey	in	“The	Black	Women	Who	Wrote	America’s	Earliest	Autofiction”:	“’black	women’s	
literature,	particularly	autobiographies,	has	too	often	been	subject	to	severe	criticism,	such	
accounts	often	being	deemed	too	personal,	or	not	political	enough’”	(Kazeem).	Sula	is	often	
reductively	taken	as	a	text	about	female	friendship,	rather	than	social	and	political	
positionality.	Given	the	white	supremacist	ideology	of	American	culture,	Black	women’s	
writing	always	already	stands	outside	of	the	dominant	discourse	and	is	forced	to	make	its	
own	spaces.	Morrison	asks	about	“literary	blackness”	in	the	“Preface”	of	Playing	in	the	Dark,	
“What	happens	to	the	writerly	imagination	of	a	black	author	who	is	at	some	level	always	
conscious	of	representing	one’s	own	race	to,	or	in	spite	of,	a	race	of	readers	that	
understands	itself	to	be	‘universal’	or	race-free?”	(xii).	This	question	uncovers	the	tension	
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of	between	Black	authorship	and	the	white	reader	with	the	dominant	white	readership	in	
the	context	of	America.	Surrounded	by	an	ideology	of	self	vs.	other	and	white	as	
“unmarked,”	Morrison	questions	the	consequences	of	being	a	Black	writer	and	performing	
Blackness	for	a	white	audience	while	at	the	same	time,	not	watering	her	writing	down.		
Which	is	precisely	why	Sula	presents	a	compelling	text	to	examine	for	the	purposes	
of	reading	identification.	The	Bottom	is	a	Black	community	positioned	up	on	a	hillside,	
overlooking	the	white	community	down	in	the	valley.	Nel	and	Sula’s	development	occurs	in	
the	context	of	the	pre-othered	Bottom,	inscribed	onto	their	bodies	as	pre-othered	Black	
women.	Where	Esther	stands	outside	of	ideology	by	the	choice	afforded	to	her	as	a	white	
woman,	Nel	and	Sula	are	excluded	from	dominant	ideology	of	white	American	culture	since	
birth.	Although	the	Bottom	provides	an	alternative	Black	ideology,	it	still	conscribes	to	the	
heterosexual.	Thus,	Nel	and	Sula	form	their	friendship	as	“creating	something	else	to	be”—
a	third	space	in	which	to	come	of	age.	Sula	is	not	a	tale	of	two	different	development	plots,	
but	of	one	conjoined	one—a	“double	female	bildungsroman”	as	termed	by	critic	Pin-chia	
Feng	in	“We	Was	Girls	Together”	(39).	Each	seeing	herself	in	the	other,	Nel	and	Sula	grow	
up	in	an	equal	exchange	of	identification.	Sula	and	Nel	present	precisely	the	push	and	pull	
of	identification/desire	described	by	Fuss	in	Identification	Papers.	Critics	such	as	Barbara	
Smith	(“Toward	a	Black	Feminist	Criticism”),	Deborah	McDowell	(“New	Directions	in	Black	
Feminist	Criticism”),	and	Barbara	Johnson	(“Lesbian	Spectacles”)	have	presented	differing	
opinions	about	queerness	between	Nel	and	Sula.	Toni	Morrison	disagrees	with	any	
implications	of	queer	desire,	cited	as	saying	“there	is	no	homosexuality	in	Sula”	in	
Conversations	with	Toni	Morrison	(157).	Therefore,	reading	queerness	depends	not	only	on	
the	reader’s	definition	of	desire,	but	also	on	a	more	protean	understanding	of	queer	theory.	
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Lee	Edelman	suggests	in	Queer	Theory	and	the	Death	Drive	that	queer	theory	constitutes	
“the	site	where	the	radical	threat	posed	by	irony”	in	text,	“which	heteronormative	culture	
displaces	onto	the	figure	of	the	queer”	(24).	The	queer	figure	thus	becomes	the	very	
disfiguration	of	identity	in	being	deviant	to	ideological	norms.	Ideology	positions	queerness	
and	Blackness	as	other	by	the	standards	of	white	America.	Reading	Nel	and	Sula	through	
the	queer	lens	of	identification	creates	a	developmental	reading	that	has	specific	grounding	
in	the	social/cultural	positions	of	the	text.	
Both	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	exemplify	compelling	iterations	of	a	long-standing	history	
of	women’s	writing.	Both	novels	also	depart	from	heterosexist	ideological	patterns.	Sula	
further	departs	from	white	supremacy;	The	Bell	Jar	does	not.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	
novels	are	the	only	novels	to	depart	from	these	patterns.	Rather,	I	chose	these	two	novels	
because	I	have	loved	them.	Both	are	novels	in	which	I	have	seen	pieces	of	myself,	both	are	
books	that	have	contributed	to	my	own	coming	of	age.	In	choosing	these	novels	to	position	
against	one	another,	I	hope	to	conduct	a	thorough	analysis	of	white	women’s	and	Black	
women’s	development	in	the	twentieth	century.	Reading	both	novels	through	the	lens	of	
race,	sexuality,	gender,	and	culture	permits	a	more	open-ended	view	of	the	bildungsroman.	
Analyzing	these	novels	through	the	psychoanalytic	lens	of	identification	will	produce	a	
more	comprehensive	perspective	on	women’s	coming	of	age	narratives.	
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Chapter	I:	Hysteria	and	Serial	Suicide	in	Sylvia	Plath’s	The	Bell	Jar	
“The	patterns	of	pain	in	the	bildungsroman	are	embedded	in	image,	
leitmotif,	and	larger	narrative	patterns;	their	antitheses	are	images	of	desire	
for	authentic	selfhood.”	
Annis	Pratt,	Archetypal	Patterns	in	Women’s	Literature	
	
	
In	her	1995	text,	Identification	Papers,	Diana	Fuss	appropriates	Freud’s	Totem	and	
Taboo	(1913)	and	Group	Psychology	and	the	Analysis	of	the	Ego	(1921)	in	order	to	construct	
a	theory	on	“identification”	that	can	be	applied	to	present-day	psychology.	More	so	than	
this,	Fuss’s	work	makes	it	possible	to	apply	Freudian	theories	to	literature	of	young	women	
without	resorting	to	reductive	and	degrading	Oedipal	readings	and	Electra	complexes.	
Fuss’s	identification	reveals	a	developmental	arc	that	gives	ample	attention	to	the	gender	
differences	that	distinguish	women’s	coming	of	age	fictions	from	that	of	men.	In	Totem	and	
Taboo,	Freud	employs	the	story	of	a	group	of	sons	murdering	and	cannibalizing	their	father	
to	explain	an	Oedipal	working	of	identification	(Fuss	32).	Fuss	theorizes	that	this	story	
“uncovers	the	violence	at	the	heart	of	identification”	(34).	The	children	destroy	the	father	
and	orally	incorporate	his	identity	into	their	own.	From	this	Fuss	also	conjectures	the	
“ambivalence”	of	identification	via	the	son’s	simultaneous	love	of	and	hate	for	the	father.	
Ambivalent	identifications	express	how	identification	travels	“a	double	current,	allowing	
for	the	possibility	of	multiple	and	contradictory	identifications	coexisting	in	the	subject	at	
the	same	time”	(34).	The	act	of	identification	is	both	a	murder	illustrating	hate,	and	an	
ingesting	suggesting	love.	As	an	act	of	violent	identification,	the	father	becomes	entombed	
within	the	sons,	a	part	of	their	own	identity.	Fuss’s	analysis	of	this	story	emphasizes	the	
insecurity	of	identification	in	its	precarious	position	at	the	intersection	of	love	and	hate.	
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The	second	story	that	Fuss	examines	comes	out	of	Freud’s	Group	Psychology	(1921).	
In	a	short	passage	from	the	text	describing	homosexuality	in	a	girl’s	boarding	school,	Freud	
claims	that	young	girls	possess	a	greater	ease	of	identification	which	leads	to	homosexual	
confusion.	Young	women,	by	Freud’s	count,	have	a	greater	“’openness’	to	emotions”	which	
mitigates	the	hysterical	spread	of	feelings	(Fuss	114).	The	terming	of	homosexuality	as	
“spreading”	throughout	the	girls	boarding	school	proves	Freud’s	effective	pathologizing	of	
queer	desire	as	a	side	effect	of	female	hysteria.	Freud	thus	conflates	the	medical	(at	the	
time)	female	hysteria	with	queer	desire,	setting	the	precedent	by	which	psychologists	will	
vilify	homosexuality	for	years	to	come.	In	several	other	studies,	such	as	Dora	(1905)	and	
“The	Psychogenesis	of	a	Case	of	Homosexuality	in	a	Woman”	(1920),	Freud	uses	this	same	
comparison	to	explain	away	queerness	as	a	hysterical	identification.	Fuss	describes	Freud’s	
belief	that	women	desiring	other	women	confuse	the	question,	“How	can	I	be	a	woman,”	
with	“How	can	I	have	one”	(29).	Where	Freud	manages	to	use	this	“confused”	conflation	to	
prove	the	pathology	of	homosexuality,	Fuss	aligns	it	to	re-define	identification,	suggesting	
that	Freud	is	correct	in	the	comparison	but	wrong	in	pathologizing	it.	Freud’s	claims	of	
binary	desires	are	so	precarious	“precisely	because	desire	and	identification	cannot	be	
securely	separated	or	easily	prevented	from	turning	back	on	one	another”	(77).	What	
Freud	claims	is	pathology,	may	actually	be	human	nature.	Identification	substantiates	
desire,	and	vice	versa.	The	two	are	interdependent	and	analogous.		
In	the	clinical	sense,	hysteria	no	longer	exists.	The	prescription	of	the	term	stems	
from	a	failed	understanding	of	women’s	mental	illness,	cultural	parameters	which	leave	
women	without	voices,	and	a	dismissal	of	women’s	physical	and	emotional	pain.	While	
psychologists	no	longer	recognize	clinical	hysteria,	the	principle	of	the	phenomenon	is	still	
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worth	examining	for	its	use	in	the	literary	arts.	Representations	of	the	woman	hysteric	
reach	from	madwoman	to	prophetess:	e.g.	Bertha	in	Jane	Eyre	(Charlotte	Bronte),	Pecola	in	
The	Bluest	Eye	(Toni	Morrison),	Medea	in	her	eponymous	ancient	Greek	drama,	Medea	
(Euripides).	In	linguistic	theory,	hysteria	is	a	particularly	potent	device	in	its	semiotic	
dimensions:	“The	hysteric	speaks	through	her	symptom,	transforming	the	body	into	a	
textual	utterance.	Although	the	hysteric’s	somatic	symptom	ostensibly	works	to	block	
interpretation…	its	very	unreadability	provokes,	even	coerces	a	reading”	(Fuss	116).	
Hysteria	relegates	the	subject	to	the	pre-language	state	of	infancy,	occupying	a	form	of	
communication	that	cannot	be	read,	but	must	be.	Elizabeth	Grosz	engages	Julia	Kristeva’s	
work	on	semiotic	language	in	Jacques	Lacan:	A	Feminist	Introduction.	Kristeva	believes	that	
hysteria	resists	the	symbol	system	of	human	language,	because	“the	symbolic	is	based	on	
the	‘repression’	or	subsumation	of	the	chaotic	semiotic	fluxes”	(152).	Because	hysteria	
cannot	be	read	or	logically	communicated	through	human	language,	it	speaks	through	
semiotics,	the	cries	and	movements	of	the	pre-linguistic.	The	semiotic	speaks	through	the	
“pleasures,	sounds,	colours,	or	movements	experienced	in	the	child’s	body”	(152).	French	
psychoanalytic	feminist	Julia	Kristeva	connects	female	speech	to	the	semiotic	because	of	
the	psychological	link	between	mother	and	child.	Ann	Rosalind	Jones	reports	Kristeva’s	
belief	that	women	“speak	and	write	as	‘hysterics’”	and	therefore	as	“outsiders	to	male-
dominated	discourse”	of	the	symbolic	language	of	speech	(249).	Women’s	texts	therefore	
communicate	using	both	the	semiotic	and	the	symbolic.	E.	Miller	Budick,	in	“The	Feminist	
Discourse	of	Sylvia	Plath’s	The	Bell	Jar”	argues	that	“Plath	not	only	perceives	the	world	in	
terms	of	competing	male	and	female	languages,	but	that	she	herself	attempts	to	write	in	the	
feminine”	(873).	Reading	Esther	Greenwood’s	mental	illness	and	suicide	attempts	in	The	
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Bell	Jar	as	a	hysteria	inscribed	through	the	semiotic	produces	a	more	nuanced	analysis	of	
the	text	as	a	bildungsroman.	Conceding	Esther’s	unreadability	as	a	hysteric	character	
mandates	that	the	critic	must	read	Esther	against	her	own	word	in	order	to	parse	the	
meaning	of	the	text.	
The	Bell	Jar’s	narration	unfolds	from	the	hysteric	mind	of	Esther	Greenwood.	Esther	
is	not	only	an	unreliable	narrator,	she	is	psychologically	damaged	and	suicidal.	Per	Fuss	
and	Kristeva’s	theory,	this	makes	Esther	an	unreadable	character	who	also	demands	
reading.	Beyond	being	an	unreliable	narrator,	she	is	also	a	dangerous	one	due	to	the	
autobiographical	leanings	of	the	text.	Critics	of	The	Bell	Jar	too	often	rely	on	content	from	
Plath’s	life	for	analysis.	Literary	scholar	Henry	Schevy	credits	Plath’s	death	with	the	
sensationalism	and	misunderstanding	of	her	work,	contending	that	too	many	“pay	
insufficient	attention	to	the	division	between	art	and	life”	(20).	Readers	look	to	Plath’s	dark	
fictional	work	and	see	Sylvia,	rather	than	Esther.	It	is	useful	to	consider	Plath’s	perspective,	
but	analysis	that	rests	on	the	novel	as	an	autobiographical	work	does	a	disservice	to	the	
text.	To	take	Plath,	or	Esther	for	that	matter,	at	her	word,	is	to	forget	that	fiction	is	meant	to	
produce	cultural	meaning	rather	than	personal.	As	American	Culture	scholar	Kate	Baldwin	
reflects,	“If,	as	Esther	constantly	reminds	us,	she	is	a	master	of	deception,	might	it	not	be	
important	to	read	her	against	her	word?”	(59).	Not	only	can	Plath	not	be	used	to	read	the	
text,	but	Esther	cannot	be	believed.	Baldwin	calls	for	a	reading	of	the	text	with	skepticism	
of	Esther’s	narrative	authority	and	deference	to	ideology.	Reading	the	novel	from	a	place	of	
distance	while	understanding	of	the	specific	positionality	of	Esther	as	a	nineteen-year-old	
white	woman	living	in	New	England	in	the	year	1953	will	produce	the	most	comprehensive	
outcome.	
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Feminist	critic	Catherine	Belsey	engages	“ideology”	as	the	most	useful	means	of	
reading	cultural	meaning	in	text.	Belsey	indicates	that	literature	has	real	world	power	due	
to	is	effects	“on	the	ways	in	which	people	grasp	themselves	and	their	relation	to	the	real	
relations	in	which	they	live”	(66).	Ideology	in	literary	texts	thus	becomes	critical	to	
determining	the	action	or	passivity	of	a	character.	French	psychoanalyst	Jacques	Lacan,	one	
of	the	louder	voices	in	psychoanalysis	of	the	subject	in	linguistics,	believes	that	subjectivity	
is	constructed	through	the	child’s	ability	to	produce	subject-position:	identification	with	
first	a	mirror	image	(his	famous	“Mirror	Phase”)	and	then	with	the	first-person	singular	
pronoun	(Belsey	60).	The	child	able	to	produce	the	mirror	phase	but	unable	to	enter	into	
the	symbolic	order	of	language	and	the	dominant	discourse	of	ideology	becomes	“sick.”	
Belsey	revises	this	theory,	suggesting	that	those	left	out	of	the	dominant	discourse	(women,	
people	of	color,	the	working	class,	those	positioned	as	the	“other”	or	“object”	in	dominant	
subject	positions)	are	more	likely	to	becomes	sick	(66).	Therefore,	looking	to	the	ways	that	
these	characters	resist	or	adhere	to	ideology,	coerces	the	best	understanding	of	the	cultural	
work	of	the	text.	
Against	the	backdrop	of	a	boiling	New	York	City,	the	first	half	of	the	novel	chronicles	
Esther’s	growing	sense	of	listlessness	and	anxieties	about	the	future.	Esther	considers	
normative	women’s	paths	which	lead	back	to	her	college	boyfriend	Buddy	Willard,	or	the	
unorthodox	decisions	which	might	bring	her	to	a	career	writing	in	New	York	City.	Critics	
such	as	Plath	scholar	Linda	Wagner-Martin	rest	much	interpretation	on	this	section:	“The	
Bell	Jar	is	plotted	to	establish	two	primary	themes:	that	of	Greenwood’s	developing	
identity,	or	lack	of	it;	and	that	of	her	battle	against	submission	to	the	authority	of	both	older	
people	and,	more	pertinently,	of	men”	(56-57).	Wagner-Martin	is	correct	in	noting	the	
	
	 21	
novel’s	careful	plotting	around	this	imagery	as	it	is	the	dominant	ideology	that	makes	up	
the	backdrop	of	the	novel.	The	now	famous	fig	tree	metaphor	serves	this	purpose	almost	
exclusively:	“I	saw	my	life	branching	out	before	me	like	the	green	fig	tree	in	the	story…”	
(Plath	77).	Choice	itself	is	a	1950s	project	for	the	white	person.	Even	as	a	working	class	
woman,	Esther	has	the	opportunity	for	upward	mobility	due	to	funded	education	and	white	
privilege.	Positioned	at	a	point	when	women’s	simultaneous	restriction	and	empowerment	
left	many	tied	up,	Esther	finds	herself	in	a	position	familiar	to	women	of	the	era.	Baldwin	
characterizes	her	as	“a	character	who	throws	herself	against	the	limited	options	available	
to	her	like	a	furious	pinball,	aiming	for	and	then	bouncing	away	from	discrete	targets	of	
female	identity”	(60).	Reading	her	against	the	marginalized	identities	of	the	narrative—a	
Russian	translator	at	the	UN	and	the	“Negro”	orderly	at	the	hospital—Baldwin	understands	
Esther	as	“the	American	girl	spoiled	by	choice”	and,	coarsely,	as	“a	little	shit”	(71).	She	is	
not	entirely	wrong—Esther’s	internal	career	discourse	derives	from	the	privilege	of	choice	
offered	to	white	women	in	the	1950s	for	the	first	time.	Though	Esther’s	family	comes	from	
a	working-class	background,	she	possesses	the	upward	mobility	of	the	Boomer	generation.	
Her	ennui	and	her	depression	are	privileges.	
Esther’s	anxieties	are	typical	of	the	19-year-old	girl	in	the	fifties.	Women,	such	as	
Esther’s	boss	Jay	Cee	at	“Ladies’	Day”	magazine,	were	just	beginning	to	move	out	of	the	
home	in	small	numbers,	providing	examples	and	glimmers	of	hope	for	ambitious	young	
women.	At	the	same	time,	“the	average	age	for	women	to	marry”	was	lingering	at	“20.3”	
years	old	(Wagner-Martin	3).	Esther	is	nineteen	at	the	beginning	of	the	novel	and	turns	
twenty	towards	the	end	(Plath	203).	Her	marriage	anxieties	may	seem	premature	to	a	
twenty-first-century-reader,	but	a	reader	in	the	fifties,	Esther's	concern	is	quite	warranted.	
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This	cultural	background	also	makes	Esther’s	careful	resistance	to	marriage	quite	unique.	
Although	Esther	does	want	a	family,	she	questions	that	desire	and	rejects	Buddy’s	proposal	
of	marriage	which	she	recounts	in	memory	(92).	Wagner-Martin	reminds	that	at	the	time,	
“the	non-married	lifestyle	was	as	suspect	as	deviant	sexual	behaviors”	(3).	Remaining	
single	meant	a	conscious	choice	live	outside	of	dominant	American	ideology	of	marriage	
and	family.	Esther’s	resistance	to	ideology	positions	her	as	deviant,	opening	up	the	space	
for	a	queer	reading	of	the	text.	As	Renée	Dowbnia	notes	in	“Consuming	Appetites,”	Esther’s	
choice	to	use	“spending	money	and	shopping	privileges	to	buy	birth	control”	rather	than	
buying	clothing	and	magazines	places	her	external	to	1950s	norms	of	womanhood	(586).	
In	the	context	of	the	1950s,	Esther	is	an	anomaly.	
Although	Esther’s	decisions	make	her	radical,	in	the	first	half	of	the	novel	she	
maintains	a	loyalty	to	normative	heterosexual	desires.	Historian	Lisa	Lindquist	Dorr	
reinforces	the	point	that	marriage,	gender	roles,	and	the	self-sufficient	nuclear	family	were	
integral	to	“what	made	America	strong	as	a	superior	white	nation”	over	the	Russian	
communists	(28).	But	with	the	advent	of	teenage	dating	and	“going	steady”	in	the	1950s,	
white	men	also	began	to	pose	a	sexual	threat.	Dating	was	meant	as	a	precursor	to	
marriage—an	institution	which	was	becoming	suspected	as	emasculating	of	the	husbands	
(30).	Thus,	the	media	began	to	perpetuate	a	narrative	of	male	“sexual	aggression”	and	
coercion	as	necessary	for	the	“masculinity	and	matrimonial	success”	of	America’s	young	
white	men	(31).	At	the	same	time,	young	women	were	expected	to	remain	steadfast	against	
the	advances	of	their	male	partners	to	protect	the	requisite	purity	of	white	female	gender	
norms.	Young	women	were	raised	to	believe	that	their	intrinsic	“value	resided	in	their	
virtue	and	attractiveness	as	a	wife,”	and	therefore	young	women	who	participated	in	1950s	
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dating	culture	resented	and	rightly	feared	the	advances	of	their	male	suitors	(33).	This	also	
places	Esther	as	squarely	outside	of	the	dominant	ideology	of	the	1950s,	as	a	woman	who	is	
interested	in	and	seeks	out	extra-marital	sexual	activity.	Though	a	young,	attractive	white	
women,	Esther	contradicts	heterosexual	ideology	for	her	resistance	to	marriage	and	
interest	in	heterosexual	intercourse.	
As	noted,	Esther’s	struggle	to	self-define	is	a	white	woman’s	problem.	In	the	context	
of	the	Cold	War	as	well	as	the	boom	of	fifties	heterosexual	ideology,	“racial	others”	inhabit	
the	framework	of	the	novel	as	outside	culture	as	well.	Kate	Baldwin	reads	Esther	against	
the	more	minor	but	still	present	racial	other	characters	in	the	novel	who	inhabit,	“The	Bell	
Jar	connects	the	ideas	of	female	discontentment	with	the	Russian	and	Negro	as	important	
players	in	U.S.	Cold	War	cosmography.	It	elaborates	on	the	alternative	intelligences	present	
in	a	narrative	that	also	announces	a	kind	of	female	domestic	incarceration”	(Baldwin	58).	
More	privileged	than	but	also	as	equally	restricted	as	the	Russian	translator	Esther	sees	in	
New	York	and	the	Black	orderly	she	meets	much	later	in	the	novel,	Esther	struggles	with	
the	confusing	positionality	of	being	white	and	a	woman	in	1953.	She	casts	about	for	self,	
but	there	is	nobody	with	whom	she	can	identify.	In	a	scene	on	a	date	at	the	United	Nations,	
Esther	wishes	to	physically	inhabit	the	Russian	translator	but	with	what	Baldwin	calls	
entirely	“removed	selfhood”	(66).	She	hopes	to	be	swallowed	up	by	the	entity	of	someone	
else	without	ever	having	to	know	her,	a	sublimation	into	someone	else	like	the	father	in	
Freud’s	story	of	the	cannibal	sons.	Later,	when	interred	at	the	city	hospital	in	Boston,	
Esther	disregards	and	mistreats	a	Black	orderly	that	“her	imprisonment	in	part	relies	on	
his”	(Baldwin	73).	Here	too,	Esther	de-humanizes	the	racial	other	for	the	sake	of	bolstering	
her	own	misery.	This	thought	process	was	used	by	America	to	fight	the	degenerate	home	
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lives	of	“others”	abroad	(the	Russian	communists)	and	at	home	(Black	individuals)	to	
maintain	the	country’s	white	supremacist	ideology.	As	individuals	whose	ideological	
existence	in	1950s	America	relies	on	an	opposition	to	America’s	white	national	narrative,	
people	of	other	races	occupy	background	space	as	objects	rather	than	subjects.	The	Russian	
woman	and	the	Black	orderly	serve	as	objects	for	Esther	to	push	up	against	and	consider,	
but	never	identify	with	or	even	acknowledge	as	people	due	to	her	racism.	Though	the	
characters	of	color	in	The	Bell	Jar	serve	to	construct	the	background	and	provide	outlets	for	
Esther	to	enact	the	frustrations	of	being	white	and	female,	they	remain	caricatures	taken	
for	granted.		
White	American	ideology	relies	so	much	on	the	exclusion	of	racial	others	that	such	
characters	cannot	even	make	Esther	recognize	her	whiteness.	For	the	first	half	of	the	novel,	
Esther	inhabits	the	spaces	of	white	women,	a	women’s	college	in	New	England	and	an	all-
female	summer	program	in	Manhattan.	Though	women’s	spaces,	they	are	not	entirely	
enclosed	against	men	and	non-white	characters.	At	college,	though	surrounded	by	other	
college	girls;	Esther	dates	Yale	medical	student	“hypocrite”	Buddy	Willard	and	outsmarts	
male	professors	(Plath	52,	37).	The	Amazon	Hotel	in	Manhattan	where	she	and	the	other	
girls	who	have	won	internships	at	fictional	“Ladies	Day”	Journal	live	is	for	young	women	
“with	wealthy	parents	who	wanted	to	be	sure	their	daughters	would	be	living	where	men	
couldn’t	get	at	them	and	deceive	them”	(4).	The	girls	may	be	safe	within	the	hotel,	but	once	
they	venture	out	into	the	city,	all	manner	of	men	abound.	Outside	the	hotel,	Esther	and	her	
friends	encounter	types	like	Lenny	Shepherd	the	radio	personality,	Constantin	the	
simultaneous	interpreter,	and	the	Peruvian	date	rapist	Marco	(11,	51,	103).	Each	
appearance	triggers	a	psychological	reaction	in	Esther	analogous	to	contamination.	Budick	
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indicates	that	Esther’s	feminine	environments	“ought	to	have	provided	Esther	with	the	
language	and	identity”	(or	identifications)	“she	seeks.	But	each	has	abnegated	authority…	
by	allowing	male	language	to	infect	and	dominate	female	expression”	(875).	The	intrusion	
of	the	male	language	via	patriarchal	presences,	and	the	interruption	of	Esther’s	beloved	
white	supremacist	ideology	by	non-white	characters	drives	Esther	to	an	obsession	with	
purity.	Images	of	water,	bathing,	and	spiritual	hygiene	emerge	in	the	text	whenever	
Esther’s	white	female	fragility	is	jeopardized.	Esther	believes	herself	contaminated	after	
witnessing	lurid	sexuality	between	her	friend	Doreen	and	Lenny	Shepherd.	At	the	
beginning	of	the	night,	Esther	compares	Doreen	to	a	Black	woman—"dusky	as	a	bleached-
blonde	Negress”—and	herself	to	a	“big	smudgy-eyed	Chinese	woman”	at	the	end	of	the	
night	(Plath	18).	The	racializing	of	Doreen	and	her	sexual	engagement	with	a	man	leads	to	
the	first	of	Esther’s	racist	purifying	rituals.	Esther	draws	a	bath	and	reveals	that	“I	never	
feel	so	much	myself	as	when	I’m	in	a	hot	bath,”	moving	back	towards	freedom	from	what	
she	perceives	to	be	immoral	sexuality	and	white	purity	(20).	Although	Esther	maintains	a	
rigid	heterosexuality,	Dorr’s	writings	on	the	violent	gender	binary	of	the	1950s	make	it	
clear	that	sexual	desire	for	men	cannot	be	enacted	safely—exemplified	in	Esther’s	rigorous	
attention	to	cleanliness	following	Doreen’s	interaction.	Per	Fuss’s	blurred	lines	of	desire	
for/identification	with,	though	Esther	exclusively	desires	men,	she	cannot	properly	
construct	identifications	with	them	without	needing	a	bath	at	the	least	and	weathering	
violence	at	the	most.	
The	alternative,	is	of	course,	identification	with	women.	Esther	is	pre-queered	
because	of	her	unorthodox	ideas	about	heterosexual	ideology.	But	in	the	first	half	of	the	
novel,	she	maintains	a	subscription	to	heterosexual	desire—which	cannot	be	fulfilled	
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safely.	Lee	Edelman,	in	Queer	Theory	and	the	Death	Drive,	reflects	on	queerness	as	
dispossessing	“the	social	order	of	the	ground	on	which	it	rests:	a	faith	in	the	consistent	
reality	of	the	social”	(6).	Esther’s	sexuality	deals	in	the	negatives	of	dominant	discourse	
enough	that	it	reads	as	queer,	prior	to	and	independent	of	any	express	desire	for	women.	
The	question	becomes	whether	or	not	Esther’s	theoretically	inscribed	queerness	can	
translate	into	viable	identification	with	women.	Esther’s	identification	practices	only	
manifest	on	the	other	side	of	her	sexual	abuse	and	suicide	attempts,	in	the	space	of	the	
mental	hospital.	In	the	first	section	of	the	novel,	Esther	makes	tries	out	identifications	with	
other	women,	but	usually	falls	short.	In	the	case	of	the	female	Russian	translator,	Esther	
wishes	to	“crawl	into	her	and	spend	the	rest	of	my	life	barking	out	one	idiom	after	another”	
(Plath	75).	The	desire	to	enter	the	Russian	woman	nears	the	consumption	and	
incorporation	of	identification	(per	Totem	and	Taboo).	But	this	identification	reflects	the	
negative	of	identity,	Esther	as	the	incorporated	object,	predicated	on	the	“the	alarming	
lure”	of	a	quite	Kristevan	“empty	speech”	(Baldwin	66).	Though	Esther’s	interest	in	the	
Russian	woman	is	a	desire	directed	towards	a	woman,	it	is	a	desire	to	disappear	into	the	
ideological	other	completely	and	therefore	not	an	identification.	Esther’s	desire	for	her	
friend	Doreen,	another	girl	on	the	summer	program	in	New	York,	is	a	different	sort	of	
animal—“Everything	she	said	was	like	a	secret	voice	speaking	straight	out	of	my	own	
bones”	(Plath	7).	This	identification	too	is	ontologically	linked	to	a	Kristevan	conception	of	
semiotic	subjectivity.	Doreen’s	voice	described	as	speaking	from	Esther’s	own	body	
represents	the	body-speech	of	the	hysteric,	and	thus	a	“hysterical”	identification.	Doreen	as	
well	might	occupy	the	queer	space	outside	white	feminine	heterosexuality,	for	her	perusal	
of	Lenny.	But	instead,	the	identification	is	marred	and	broken	by	the	heterosexual	intrusion	
	
	 27	
of	Lenny,	with	whom	Doreen	begins	a	normative	relationship—“she	spent	most	of	her	free	
time	with	Lenny	Shepherd	now”	(25).	Afterwards,	Esther	pledges	her	loyalty	to	Betsy,	a	
sexually	clean	girl	also	on	the	summer	program,	who	Esther	believes	she	“resembled	at	
heart”	(22).	But	Betsy,	like	Doreen,	is	an	insufficient	double,	who	cannot	facilitate	
meaningful	identification	in	being	so	“easily	categorized—stereotyped”	(Wagner-Martin	
65).	Though	surrounded	by	safe	white	women,	Esther	cannot	identify	with	them.	
Queerness	is	interrupted	by	dominant	heterosexual	ideology,	and	white	supremacy	is	
threatened	by	the	presence	of	non-white	people,	disallowing	Esther	from	fully	identifying	
with	other	women.	
Which	is	why	the	sexual	assault	scene	in	Chapter	Nine	figures	as	the	prompt	for	
Esther’s	descent	into	hysteria	and	suicidal	urges.	The	ideology	of	present	day	understands	
the	attack	as	a	sexual	assault.	But	1950s	ideology	obscures	this,	for	Esther	is	on	a	date	with	
her	attacker—a	Latin	American	man	named	Marco.	“Date	Rape”	as	it	is	understood	now,	
did	not	exist	in	1953,	nor	even	in	1963	when	The	Bell	Jar	was	published.	Though	Dorr	
catalogues	examples	of	date	rape	in	The	Perils	of	the	Back	Seat,	she	clarifies	in	the	notes	
that	“date	rape	or	acquaintance	rape	were	terms	coined	in	the	1970s”	and	still	remained	
relatively	invisible,	seen	“as	a	‘lesser’	crime	either	because	the	woman	somehow	‘asked	for	
it’	or	because	the	associated	trauma	is	presumed	to	be	less	because	she	knew	her	attacker”	
(43	n5).	The	assault	Esther	experiences	is	not	even	a	true	rape—it	is	the	kind	of	attack	that	
women	expected	to	endure	on	dates	at	the	time.	In	1950s	sexual	ideology	and	dating	
culture,	this	sort	of	assault	was	normal:	“Sociological	studies	made	it	frighteningly	clear	
how	frequent	male	aggression	was	and,	indeed,	how	normal,	accepted	and	silenced	it	
remained”	(34).	On	this	basis,	the	assault	is	silenced	first	by	the	text	and	doubly	by	the	
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critics	who	fail	to	acknowledge	it.	Scholars	often	skirt	around	Esther’s	sexual	assault,	
describing	Marco’s	actions	as	an	“attempt	to	rape”	(Boyer	210).	But	at	the	same	time,	the	
violent	language	of	the	attack	and	Marco’s	specific	designation	as	“Peruvian”	signals	what	
1950s	constructions	of	rape	looked	like:	
Then	he	threw	himself	face	down	as	if	he	would	grind	his	body	through	me	and	into	
the	mud.	“It’s	happening,”	I	thought.	“It’s	happening.	If	I	just	lie	here	and	do	nothing	
it	will	happen.”	Marco	set	his	teeth	to	the	strap	at	my	shoulder	and	tore	my	sheath	to	
the	waist.	I	saw	the	glimmer	of	bare	skin,	like	a	pale	veil	separating	two	bloody-
minded	adversaries.	“Slut!”	The	word	hissed	by	my	ear.	“Slut!”	The	dust	cleared,	and	
I	had	a	full	view	of	the	battle.	I	began	to	writhe	and	bite…	Then	I	fisted	my	fingers	
together	and	smashed	them	at	his	nose.	It	was	like	hitting	the	steel	plate	of	a	
battleship.	Marco	sat	up.	I	began	to	cry.	(Plath	109)	
	
Plath’s	characterization	of	the	attack	using	words	like	“threw	himself,”	“grind,”	“tore,”	
bloody-minded,”	and	“battle”	associate	the	scene	with	violent	rape.	Dorr	outlines	several	
rape	cases	from	the	1950s	in	her	article,	noting	that	each	incident	survives	because	“they	
outline	the	extremes	of	male	aggression,	and	because	they	resulted	in	conviction,	no	small	
feat	at	a	time	when	women	were	blamed	routinely	for	their	inability	to	fend	off	aggressive	
men”	(34).	Both	the	scenario	of	the	date	and	Esther’s	ability	to	effectively	fend	off	her	
assailant	silence	this	scene	as	a	“non-rape”	in	terms	of	dominant	fifties	ideology.	Neither	
Plath	nor	Esther	have	the	appropriate	language	for	the	attack,	and	it	sinks	into	the	
background.	However,	the	violence	and	racial	construction	of	the	scene	ontologically	link	
the	attack	to	a	rape.	
As	does	Esther’s	response.	Although	she	remains	a	virgin,	she	is	still	physically	
damaged	via	her	dress.	The	“glimmer	of	bare	skin,	like	a	pale	veil”	indicates	a	transgression	
of	psychological	and	bodily	integrity	and	drives	Esther	to	fight	back	(Plath	109).	Although	
Esther’s	action	in	the	scene	can	be	ideologically	read	as	what	she	should	do	(per	the	1950s),	
it	can	also	be	read	per	today	as	evidence	that	she	would	have	suffered	worse	had	she	not	
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acted.	Boyer	has	a	similar	claim,	describing	Esther’s	move	to	fight	back	as	an	attempt	to	
create	her	story	“in	blood	because	language	eludes	her”	(209).	Boyer	composes	this	
moment	as	an	instance	of	the	bodily	inscription	onto	which	trauma	can	be	read.	To	return	
to	the	1950s,	Marco’s	racial	designation—"from	Peru”—describes	the	“racialized	
narratives”	of	white	women’s	victimhood	in	rape	in	Dorr’s	piece	(Plath	103)	(Dorr	28).	
Juxtaposed	with	Doreen’s	all-American	date,	“a	tall	boy	in	shirtsleeves	and	a	blond	
crewcut,”	Marco	is	“also	tall,	but	dark,	with	slightly	longer	hair”	and	has	a	“flickering	smile”	
which	reminds	Esther	of	snake	(Plath	104,	105,	106).	Marco	fits	among	the	other	non-white	
individuals	in	the	territory	of	The	Bell	Jar.	But	unlike	the	Black	orderly	or	the	Russian	
translator,	Marco	is	an	“other”	in	the	white	American	ideological	paradigm	of	the	1950s	
who	possesses	an	active	status.	Also,	unlike	the	Black	orderly	or	the	Russian	translator,	this	
moment	signifies	Esther’s	usually	unmarked	race	in	the	negative	of	Marco’s.	Boyer	alleges	
that	Marco	wiping	his	spilled	the	blood	onto	a	white	handkerchief	enacts	Marco’s	marking	
of	Esther’s	white	body:	“This	blood	that	Marco	sheds	and	writes	indelibly	upon	a	white	
background,	is	his	text	written	upon	an	assaulted,	nearly	raped,	woman”	(209).	After	
wiping	his	nose	onto	a	handkerchief,	he	then	wipes	his	blood	onto	Esther’s	cheek—
fulfilling	Esther’s	perceived	racial	tainting	and	performing	a	protracted	sexual	marking.	
Marco	exists	only	in	this	story	as	a	construction	of	1950s	rape	ideology,	which	relied	
on	the	victimhood	of	white	women	and	the	aggression	of	non-white	men,	most	
prototypically	Black	men.	White	men	were	supposed	to	be	protectors	of	white	women,	and	
Black	men	the	aggressors.	According	to	Dorr,	for	a	century	prior	to	the	1950s,	“white	
women	had	been	warned	of	the	dangers	of	black	men”	with	a	supposed	lust	for	white	flesh	
(28).	Dorr	describes	the	much-circulated	discourse	in	the	South	of	the	“black	beast	rapist,	
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the	mythical	black	man	crazed	to	gratify	his	supposed	lust	for	white	women”	(38).	
According	to	the	tale,	roving	gangs	of	Black	youths	were	“known”	to	snatch	white	women	
from	their	white	dates	back	seats	of	cars	and	sexually	brutalize	them.	These	“cases”	were	
“more	likely	to	be	reported	and	accepted	by	authorities	because	they	confirmed	
assumptions	held	by	many	white	southerners”	(39).	They	were	also	more	likely	to	be	
fabricated,	and	it	became	quite	common	for	white	couples	caught	“necking”	to	blame	young	
Black	men	for	sexually	abusing	the	white	women.	As	sexual-violence	activist	and	lawyer	G.	
Chezia	Carraway	puts	it,	prosecution	of	rape	cases	perpetrated	by	non-white	men	was	most	
often	as	a	“thinly	veiled	appeal	for	a	public	lynching”	(1303).	White	men	were,	of	course,	a	
much	larger	threat	in	the	close	quarters	of	1950s	dating	culture,	and	women	of	color	are	
almost	four	times	more	likely	than	white	women	to	be	raped	according	to	a	1987	study	
(1303).	The	number	of	instances	of	sexual	violence	against	both	women	of	color	and	white	
women	in	1953,	1987,	and	in	2019	are	much	greater.	Dorr’s	cases	of	Black	male	rapists	are	
also	specific	to	African	American	and	white	relations	in	the	1950s,	but	that	should	by	no	
means	suggest	that	other	men	of	color	were	not	perceived	to	be	predators.		
As	non-white	as	well	as	non-American,	Marco	stands	outside	of	the	white	
heterosexual	ideology	of	the	1950s,	representing	a	threat	to	American	ideals.	Noting	this,	a	
reader	should	approach	an	analysis	of	this	scene	with	the	assumption	that	Plath	is	likely	to	
have	adhered	to	an	ideology	of	racialized	rape	in	order	to	make	the	psychological	impact	of	
Esther’s	assault	evident.	The	scene	produces	a	confluence	of	contradictory	ideological	
meanings.	All	at	the	same	time,	it	is	standard	date	activity,	“date	rape,”	not	rape,	and	
racially	constructed	abuse.	The	scene	in	itself	is	a	hysteric	one,	which	leads	“the	analyst	
through	a	thicket	of	confusing	and	shifting	identifications”	(Fuss	116).	Reading	this	scene,	
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thus	must	rely	on	the	identifications	the	both	construct	it	and	follow	it.	While	Marco	and	
Esther	dance	prior	to	the	assault,	they	dance,	and	Marco	leads,	and	Esther	“seemed	to	be	
riveted	to	him”	(Plath	107).	This	is	emblematic	of	heterosexual	desire:	the	consumption	of	
the	passive	(woman)	by	the	active	(man).	Marco’s	dual	activity	as	a	man	and	passivity	as	an	
"other"	is	marked	in	this	scene	as	a	violent	identification—one	in	which	Esther	is	
consumed	and	then	quickly	rejected.	Marco	attacks,	retreats,	then	marks	Esther	with	his	
own	blood.	Remaining	is	an	ambivalent,	hysterical	identification—a	simultaneous	belief	
that	the	attack	is	deserved	and	desirous	as	well	as	violent.	Unable	to	reconcile	what	she	
believes	the	attack	to	be—a	nonevent,	a	narrow	escape—with	the	trauma	she	feels,	Esther	
turns	to	self-violent	identification.	Esther	attempts	to	simultaneously	destroy	and	
incorporate	an	identification	with	Marco	into	her	physical	body.	
Constructing	this	scene	along	the	lines	of	what	the	twenty	first	century	reader	
would	understand	to	be	sexual	assault	is	critical	in	explaining	Esther’s	psychological	
response	and	descent	into	hysteria.	Following	the	assault	scene,	Esther	throws	away	all	of	
her	clothing	and	begins	rejecting	the	cleanliness	adopted	in	the	first	half	of	the	novel.	This	
begins	Esther’s	hysterical	descent	into	ambivalent,	violent	identification.	On	the	deserted	
roof	of	the	Amazon	Hotel,	Esther	tosses	her	wardrobe	away:	“Piece	by	piece,	I	fed	my	
wardrobe	to	the	night	wind,	and	flutteringly,	like	a	loved	one’s	ashes,	the	gray	scraps	were	
ferried	off,	to	settle	here,	there,	exactly	where	I	would	never	know,	in	the	dark	heart	of	New	
York”	(Plath	111).	Wagner-Martin	posits	this	is	Esther’s	rejection	of	femininity,	of	“the	
traditional	image	of	the	pretty,	smart	girl,	object	for	man’s	acquisition”	(61).	Baldwin	
renders	it	as	a	“rejection	of	consumer	abundance”	(62).	Both	are	in	part	true.	Replacing	
Esther’s	sexual	self	is	a	traumatized	one.	In	place	of	the	“pretty,	smart	girl”	with	all	the	
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tokens	of	Capital	consumerist	ideology—"…all	those	uncomfortable,	expensive	clothes…	
same	size-seven	patent	leather	shoes…	skimpy	imitation	silver-lamé	bodice	stuck	on	to	a	
big,	fat	cloud	of	white	tulle…”—is	a	girl	who	feels	alienated	from	her	body	(Plath	2).	
Attractive	advertising	can	no	longer	disguise	the	emptiness	and	trauma	of	Esther’s	
confused	identification	with	Marco.	But	beyond	rejecting	femininity	or	capitalism,	Esther	is	
performing	the	first	murder	of	the	heterosexual	identification	with	Marco.		Esther	was	not	
penetrated	or	physically	harmed	during	her	assault,	but	her	dress	was	ripped	to	reveal	her	
naked	body	in	all	its	white	female	fragility.	Esther’s	beautiful	clothing	and	subscription	to	
1950s	white	feminine	norms	cannot	protect	her	from	the	threat	of	heterosexuality.	In	a	
way	the	pale	glimmer	of	her	naked	body	functions	as	a	semiotic	signal,	an	imperative	to	act,	
revealing	“the	battle.”	
Rejecting	the	feminine	sexuality	of	her	skimpy	dresses,	Esther	seeks	to	formulate	
identification	with	pure	Betsy	once	more.	In	the	morning,	Esther	boards	the	train	home	to	
Boston	wearing	Betsy’s	clothing.	Henry	Schevy	points	out	Betsy’s	loaned	clothing,	“Having	
flung	her	clothes	from	the	top	of	the	hotel,	she	abandons	her	old	self…	for	Betsy’s	home-
spun	blouse	and	dirndl	skirt”	(Schevy	28).	In	wearing	Betsy’s	clean,	demure	clothing	home,	
Esther	attempts	to	re-identify	with	Betsy,	who	she	had	decided	she	most	resembled.	But,	
she	leaves	Marco’s	blood	on	her	cheek:	“I	thought	I	would	carry	[the	blood	stains]	around	
with	me,	like	the	relic	of	a	dead	lover”	(Plath	112-113).	Boyer	claims	Esther	“wants	to	be	
noticed	as	one	who	has	paid	the	price	of	sexual	sisterhood—except	that	she	is	still	a	virgin”	
(210).	Affixing	meaning	to	her	experience	without	being	physically	maimed,	Esther	keeps	
what	Marco	has	“written”	onto	her,	as	a	hysterical,	semiotic,	utterance	of	her	trauma.	This	
blood	signifies	the	price	that	Esther	has	not	managed	to	pay	with	the	blood	her	own	hymen.	
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Marco’s	blood	also	might	represent	a	“primitive	life	fluid”	that	isn’t	semen,	a	failure	to	fully	
rape	(210).	The	remaining	stain	is	first	a	marking	by	Marco,	and	a	marking	by	Esther	who	
chooses	not	to	wash	it	off.	The	mark	both	retains	the	perceived	impurity	of	the	racial	and	
heterosexual	per	Esther’s	racist	purity	rituals	and	signifies	physical	proof	that	Esther	has	
been	violated.	Describing	the	blood	as	“relic	of	a	dead	lover”	reflects	Esther’s	need	to	carry	
something,	some	evidence	of	her	trauma.	Leaving	the	blood	marking	on	her	cheek	reveals	
that	she	no	longer	feels	the	white	clean	femininity	she	used	to	seek,	that	Betsy’s	clothing	is	
a	poor	disguise	and	a	failed	identification.	This	scene	is	Esther’s	first	attempt	to	murder	and	
replace	the	ambivalent	heterosexual	identification	with	Marco.	
From	this	point	on,	Esther	begins	to	spiral.	Continuing	to	wear	Betsy’s	skirt	and	
blouse,	Esther	refuses	to	wash	and	fails	to	sleep	(Plath	127).	Esther	seeks	to	be	consumed	
by	the	other,	trying	and	failing	to	attach	an	identification	to	Betsy	by	wearing	her	clothing,	
similar	to	the	case	of	the	Russian	translator.	As	her	depression	deepens,	Esther	finds	she	
cannot	read	and	cannot	write—"The	letters	grew	barbs	and	rams’	horns.	I	watched	them	
separate,	each	from	the	other,	and	jiggle	up	and	down	in	a	silly	way”	(124).	As	symbolic	
speech	fails	her	and	the	semiotic	goes	unheard	in	the	male	structured	linguistic	world,	
Esther	presses	further	and	further	into	complete	silence.	Her	descent	is	brought	to	its	
climax	by	the	faulty	electroshock	therapy	at	the	hands	of	her	psychiatrist	Doctor	Gordon,	
another	domineering	male	figure.	Like	Marco,	Doctor	Gordon	is	a	disjointing	figure	“who	
confuses	and	mangles	and	veritably	obliterates	Esther’s	identity”	(Budick	879).	The	
electroshock	therapy	thus	portrays	a	second	rape.	Esther	describes	the	therapy	in	terms	of	
assault:	“Then	something	bent	down	and	took	hold	of	me	and	shook	me	like	the	end	of	the	
world…	I	wondered	what	terrible	thing	it	was	that	I	had	done”	(Plath	143).	Esther’s	
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language	of	self-blame	signals	a	trauma	response	to	the	electroshock	therapy.	Anne	
Cluysenaar	believes	that	Plath’s	writing	bears	the	marking	of	“a	typical	survivor	in	the	
psychiatric	sense”	of	having	weathered	“extreme	vulnerability	to	danger”	(qtd.	in	Wagner-
Martin	63-64).	While	Cluysenaar	means	Plath	writes	as	a	survivor	of	suicide,	the	same	logic	
can	be	applied	to	Esther’s	response	to	the	painful	electroshock	therapy	in	terms.	It	is	
language	that	correlates	directly	with	Marco’s	attack	and	bears	the	marks	of	the	blame	she	
no	doubt	feels	for	suffering	such	an	advance.	The	electroshock	therapy	can	also	be	read	as	
trauma	response	also	because	it	figures	immediately	before	Esther	begins	to	consider	and	
then	act	on	suicidal	urges.	
The	very	next	passage	in	the	text	outlines	Esther’s	first	interest	in	suicide.	Telling	
her	mother	that	she	is	“through	with	that	Doctor	Gordon,”	Esther	attempts	to	divulge	her	
pain	through	the	semiotic	speech	of	suicide.	Each	of	Esther’s	five	suicide	attempts	
reference	water:	sea	water,	bath	water,	or	womb	water.	The	first	time,	Esther	considers	
slitting	her	wrists	in	the	bath:	“I	thought	it	would	be	easy,	lying	in	the	tub	and	seeing	the	
redness	flower	from	my	wrists”	(Plath	147).	The	second	time,	she	visits	the	ocean	she	
frequented	as	a	child:	“A	wave	drew	back,	like	a	hand,	and	then	advanced	and	touched	my	
foot…	I	waited,	as	if	the	sea	could	make	my	decision	for	me”	(153).	In	the	third,	she	thinks	
of	her	grandmother’s	house	and	boats:	“I	thought	with	longing	of	the	house	my	
grandmother	had	before	she	sold	it…	and	overhead	beams	thick	as	a	ship’s	timbers”	(158).	
In	the	fourth,	she	attempts	to	drown	herself	in	the	sea:	“The	water	pressed	in	on	my	
eardrums	and	on	my	heart”	(161).	In	the	fifth,	she	sequesters	herself	in	the	womblike	space	
of	her	mother’s	basement,	where	“A	dim	undersea	light	filtered	through	the	slits	of	the	
cellar	windows”	(168).	The	images	of	water	in	each	attempt	signal	the	pre-symbolic	space	
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of	childhood,	the	semiotic.	Literary	critic	Annis	Pratt’s	analysis	in	Archetypal	Patterns	in	
Women’s	Literature	outlines	the	presence	of	natural	imagery	in	healing	from	rape	trauma.	
Pratt	theorizes	that	in	classical	literature	and	mythmaking,	men	are	“agents	of	harsh	
disruption”	to	the	feminine	space	of	nature,	which	signifies	“freedom,	solace,	and	
protection”	(Pratt	25).	Pratt	references	women	in	Greek	myths	turning	into	laurel	trees,	
reeds,	or	springs	to	escape	rape	(Pratt	25).	Pratt	also	quotes	Simone	de	Beauvoir,	who	
believes	young	girls	“devote	a	special	love	to	Nature:	still	more	than	the	adolescent	boy,	she	
worships	it…	it	is	her	kingdom	as	a	whole;	when	she	takes	possession	of	it,	she	also	proudly	
takes	possession	of	herself”	(362).	For	the	young	girl,	nature	thus	becomes	a	space	of	
generative	subjectivity.	This	is	evidenced	in	one	of	Esther’s	few	references	to	her	
childhood:	“I	felt	happier	than	I	had	been	since	I	was	about	nine	and	running	along	the	hot	
white	beaches	with	my	father	the	summer	before	he	died”	(Plath	75).	The	ocean	and	water	
are	sites	of	happiness	and	innocence	for	Esther.	
Water	also	thus	occupies	the	semiotic	space	of	childhood	through	which	Esther	can	
inscribe	her	trauma.	Attempting	to	drown	herself	at	the	beach,	Esther’s	body	speaks	back	
to	her,	asserting	its	own	existence,	“As	I	paddled	on,	my	heartbeat	boomed	like	a	dull	motor	
in	my	ears.	I	am	I	am	I	am”	(Plath	158).	This	insistence	of	the	semiotic	signals	that	Esther	
must	both	move	through	death	back	to	childhood	semiotics,	in	order	to	re-learn	the	
symbolic	and	form	proper	identifications	to	replace	the	traumatic	one	with	Marco.	Like	
identification	in	Totem	and	Taboo,	Esther’s	suicide	attempts	are	simultaneously	destructive	
and	constructive	of	latent	heterosexual	identification	with	Marco—whom	she	desires	and	
despises	at	the	same	time.	The	multiplicity	of	the	attempts	aligns	with	the	repeated	elegy	of	
identification—"Identification	is	itself	an	act	of	serial	killing”	(Fuss	93).	Each	suicide	
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attempt,	though	failing	to	result	in	death,	enacts	a	murder	of	the	ambivalent	identification	in	
its	conjuring	of	Esther’s	semiotic	subjectivity.	Generative	of	subjectivity	through	nature	and	
as	semiotic	speech,	Esther’s	suicide	attempts	thus	move	towards	rebirth	as	well	as	death.	
The	“success”	of	Esther’s	last	suicide	attempt	in	returning	her	to	life	is	predicated	
upon	the	two	scenes	just	prior	to	it.	First,	Esther	delivers	flowers	to	a	maternity	ward	while	
volunteering	at	a	local	hospital.	Esther	notices	“that	a	lot	of	flowers	were	droopy	and	
brown	at	the	edges”	and	begins	to	pick	out	the	dead	ones,	thinking	that	“it	would	be	
discouraging	for	a	woman	who’d	just	had	a	baby	to	see	somebody	plonk	down	a	big	
bouquet	of	dead	flowers	in	front	of	her”	(Plath	162).	Presented	with	women	marked	by	
(supposedly	consensual)	sex,	Esther	rejects	the	wilted	flowers	as	she	rejects	her	own	
tainted	body.	When	the	women	object	to	the	rearrangement	of	their	flowers,	Esther	runs	
from	the	hospital,	directly	(it	seems),	to	the	graveyard	where	her	father	is	buried—
stopping	only	for	new	flowers.	At	her	father’s	grave,	she	sinks	to	the	ground	begins	to	cry:	
“I	laid	my	face	to	the	smooth	face	of	the	marble	and	howled	my	loss	into	the	cold	salt	rain”	
(167).	“Salt”	is	an	unusual	adjective	for	rain,	it	is	a	reference	to	tears,	to	the	sea	of	Esther’s	
childhood,	and	thus	to	her	previous	suicide	attempts.	Perhaps	this	is	the	same	sort	of	rain	
that	doesn’t	wash	you	clean	(41).	Henry	Schevy	makes	the	same	connection:	“water	is	also	
associated	with	her	father	because	of	childhood	memories”	(33).	However,	his	reading	of	
this	scene	relies	on	intertextuality	and	a	Freudian	perspective.	Citing	Plath’s	poem	“Daddy”	
(1965),	Schevy	implies	that	Esther	sexually	desires	her	father,	wishing	“to	entomb	herself	
alive”	and	join	him	in	death	(34).	To	push	back	against	this	reductively	Oedipal	analysis,	
one	might	consider	that	Esther	desires	not	her	father	but	the	feeling	of	being	a	child	again.	
Reading	Esther’s	howling	as	a	verbalization	allows	for	a	reading	like	this	to	move	away	
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from	the	Oedipal	and	towards	the	identificatory,	the	semiotic.	Esther	has	been	unable	to	
express	her	suffering	until	this	moment—"I	can’t	sleep,	I	can’t	read”	(Plath	126).	She	
discusses	symptoms	but	cannot	explain	her	pain	or	the	trauma	that	has	caused	it.	
Linguistics	theorist	Elaine	Scarry,	in	The	Body	in	Pain,	asserts	that,	“Whatever	pain	
achieves,	it	achieves	in	part	through	its	unsharability,	and	it	ensures	that	unsharability	
through	its	resistance	to	language”	(4).	Pain	is	un-sharable	through	the	dominant	discourse	
of	the	human	symbol	system.	It	is	sharable	through	the	semiotic	speech	of	the	body,	which	
asserts	itself	through	the	childlike	wailing	of	Esther	at	her	father’s	grave.	Esther	hasn’t	felt	
happy	since	before	her	father	died	and	her	family	moved	away	from	the	ocean	(Plath	150)	
Faced	again	with	her	father,	moving	through	suicides	which	generate	attachment	to	water,	
Esther	reverts	to	the	semiotic	and	manages	to	speak	for	the	first	time.	This	
acknowledgement	thus	permits	Esther’s	rebirth	into	a	space	of	female	identification—
moving	away	from	the	male,	the	Oedipal,	the	heterosexual.	
The	location	of	Esther’s	final	suicide	attempt	presents	ample	evidence	for	a	move	
towards	the	feminine.	Taking	sleeping	pills,	Esther	sequesters	herself	in	the	small	earthy	
crawlspace	in	the	basement	of	her	mother’s	house	lit	by	a	“dim	undersea	light”	and	sinks	
into	a	watery	sleep:	“The	silence	drew	off,	baring	the	pebbles	and	shells	and	all	the	tatty	
wreckage	of	my	life.	Then,	at	the	rim	of	vision,	it	gathered	itself,	and	in	one	sweeping	tide,	
rushed	me	to	sleep”	(Plath	169).	The	“undersea	light”	of	the	basement	and	the	“sweeping	
tide”	which	brings	her	into	“sleep,”	are	all	emblematic	of	womb	water.	This	
characterization	substantiates	a	reading	of	Esther’s	final	suicide	attempt	as	a	backwards	
movement	toward	the	semiotic,	which	Kristeva	considers	“a	feminine	and	maternally	
structured	space”	which	“pre-dates	the	imposition	of	the	(oedipal)	sexual	identity”	(Grosz	
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160).	If	ore-death	is	marked	by	Esther’s	infantile	wailing	at	her	father’s	grave	like	the	
newborn	crying	in	its	father’s	arms,	Esther’s	“death”	is	the	insemination	and	birth	into	the	
mental	hospital.	She	first	performs	her	own	burial/conception	in	her	mother’s	
womb/basement,	which	E.	Miller	Budick	considers	“the	ultimately	fatal	female	retreat”	
(877).	Then,	in	her	watery	sleep	she	moves	through	the	birth	canal	of	the	crawlspace	and	
emerges	on	the	other	end	into	the	semiotic	order	of	the	hospital.	This	backwards	birth	
completes	the	destruction	and	integration	of	Esther’s	identification	with	Marco,	in	
delivering	Esther	through	vocalization	of	pain,	rejection	of	the	masculine	symbolic	
language,	and	into	healing.	As	Schevy	points	out,	Esther’s	death	drive	is	“not	only	a	wish	to	
die	but	a	wish	to	be	unborn,”	and	that	“she	is	very	much	in	an	analogous	situation	to	a	new-
born	child	in	that	she	too	lacks	an	identity”	(32).	On	the	opposite	side	she	will	begin	her	
official	developmental	plot	in	the	feminine	space	of	the	private	hospital.	As	a	space	
comprised	of	only	white	women,	the	hospital	operates	by	different	rules.	Esther	is	not	only	
able	to	take	her	first	steps	into	the	symbolic,	but	also	properly	into	the	queer.	Esther’s	
suicide/birth	paves	the	way	for	new	identifications	with	female	characters,	female	spaces,	
and	female	desire	that	will	both	allow	for	acknowledgement	of	her	trauma	and	also	replace	
it.	
	 Esther	enters	into	the	new	world	of	her	post-suicide	attempt	life	incredulous	of	
others,	but	with	a	newfound	boldness.	In	the	city	hospital,	Esther’s	association	of	men	with	
violence	and	deceit	pushes	through	to	the	surface,	“Some	of	them	looked	so	young	I	knew	
they	couldn’t	be	proper	doctors”	(Plath	179).	Female	healing	obviously	cannot	be	
facilitated	in	a	male	dominated	space,	but	at	least	Esther	can	now	verbalize	this	and	seek	to	
leave	it.	Additionally,	the	city	hospital	is	inhabited	by	people	of	other	races.	This	is	where	
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the	Black	orderly	appears,	the	only	character	who	sees	Esther	for	what	she	truly	is,	a	“Miss	
Mucky-Muck”	(181).	Ideologically	his	presence	in	the	text	is	an	intrusion.	Kate	Baldwin	
compares	this	to	Richard	Nixon’s	empty	declaration	of	“diversity	as	equal	to	the	abundance	
of	choice,”	as	actual	diversity	“would	require	opening	selfhood	to	difference”	(72-73).	
Esther’s	white	supremacy	prohibits	such	an	opening.	The	exchange	thus	reveals	Esther	as	
not	only	picky,	but	also	unreservedly	racist.	Esther’s	entry	into	the	symbolic	permits	a	full	
rejection	of	men	and	heterosexual	ideology,	but	it	also	facilitates	Esther’s	racism.	Having	
been	re-birthed,	Esther	is	now	able	to	take	the	“’raw	material’	of	signification,	the	
corporeal,	libidinal	matter”	of	the	semiotic,	and	harness	it	“for	social	cohesion	and	
regulation”	(Grosz	151).	Esther	has	re-connected	with	the	semiotic,	allowing	a	newfound	
ability	to	vocalize	feelings	and	needs	for	the	better	of	her	identification	but	the	worse	of	her	
racial	tolerance.	Esther	begs	her	mother	to	help	her	“get	out	of	here…	You	got	me	in	here…	
You	get	me	out”	(Plath	179).	To	Esther’s	surprise,	her	mother	agrees	and	delivers,	proving	
the	power	of	her	words	and	effective	power	of	mirroring.	Mrs.	Greenwood	enlists	the	help	
of	Philomena	Guinea	(the	wealthy	woman	responsible	for	Esther’s	scholarship	to	Smith),	
who	funds	Esther’s	transfer	to	a	private	hospital	free	of	male	doctors,	elderly	patients,	and	
minority	orderlies.	This	signals	the	upward	mobility	of	a	white	woman	attuned	to	symbolic	
language	and	dominant	discourse,	allowing	Esther	to	mitigate	her	own	healing	by	speaking	
the	right	language.	
In	the	private	hospital,	Esther	finally	enters	the	space	of	enclosed	white	femininity	
where	queer	identifications	can	flourish.	Nicholas	Donofrio	asserts	that	Esther’s	private	
hospital	“appears	very	much	like	a	women’s	college”	with	its	(white)	“genteel	names”	and	
residents	who	“roam	the	grounds,	visit	each	other’s	rooms,	and	read	and	talk	about	the	
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latest	issues	of	Vogue”	(238).	The	comparison	is	apt,	for	women’s	colleges	both	promote	the	
empowerment	and	confidence	of	their	students	and	also	tend	to	accrue	rumors	of	
“lesbianism”	occurring	within	their	walls.	Esther’s	new	female	psychiatrist,	Doctor	Nolan,	
operates	as	both	a	teacher	and	maternal	mirroring	entity.	Emboldened	by	the	positive	
results	from	speaking	up	to	her	mother,	Esther	describes	the	electric	shock	therapy	she	
received	from	a	male	doctor	before	her	suicide	attempts	began,	“No,	I	didn’t	like	him	at	all…	
I	didn’t	like	what	he	did	to	me.’	‘Did	to	you?’	I	told	Doctor	Nolan	about	the	machine,	and	the	
blue	flashes,	and	the	jolting	and	the	noise…”	(Plath	189).	This	conversation	reads	as	
Esther’s	first	verbal	admission	of	disliking	her	assault.	But	it	is	still	from	a	distance,	because	
while	Esther	has	language	for	the	pain	of	the	electroshock	therapy,	she	still	does	not	
possess	the	term	“date	rape”	or	“sexual	assault.”	Still,	the	mere	ability	merely	to	disclose	
this	dislike	reflects	Esther’s	movement	away	from	desiring	heterosexuality.	Doctor	Nolan	
assures	Esther	‘That	was	a	mistake,’	she	said	then.	‘It’s	not	supposed	to	be	like	that”	and	
that	her	new	electroshock	treatments	will	be	“like	going	to	sleep,”	drawing	a	connection	to	
Esther’s	womb	suicide	(189).	An	identification	with	Doctor	Nolan	quickly	replaces	the	
latent	one	with	male	harm-doers.	E.	Miller	Budick	argues	that	when	Esther	receives	
electroshock	therapy	at	the	private	hospital,	Doctor	Nolan	“confirms	Esther’s	identity	and	
reestablishes	her	sense	of	self.	She	names	Esther,	repeating	her	name	three	times,	and	
speaks	directly	to	her”	(880).	Esther’s	identification	with	Doctor	Nolan	is	more	maternal	
than	desirous,	but	it	mitigates	the	more	sexually	based	female	identifications	in	the	clean,	
feminine,	and	overwhelmingly	white	private	hospital.	It	is	Doctor	Nolan	who	signs	off	on	
Esther’s	diaphragm	and	suggests	the	possible	nurturance	of	female	identifications:	“I	don’t	
see	what	women	see	in	other	women,”	Esther	asks,	“What	does	a	woman	see	in	a	woman	
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that	she	can’t	see	in	a	man?”	(Plath	219).	Doctor	Nolan	replies	only,	“Tenderness”	(219).	
Esther	ultimately	finds	the	greatest	identification	with	Joan	Giling,	another	white	
girl	at	the	private	hospital—but	one	who	Esther	knew	from	before	her	hysteria.	Joan	grew	
up	in	the	same	town	as	Esther,	attended	the	same	women’s	college,	and	also	dated	Buddy	
Willard.	Notably,	Joan	presents	a	viable	double	for	Esther	because	she	is	not	so	much	an	
‘other’	as	a	‘self’,	sharing	so	many	of	the	same	social	positions	of	Esther	(white,	wealthy,	
clean).	Sylvia	Plath	wrote	her	own	thesis	at	Smith	on	the	presence	of	the	double	in	
literature.	Linda	Wagner-Martin	describes	Plath’s	discovery	of	the	“psychological	
necessity”	of	an	‘other,’	for	the	purpose	of	“recognizing	within	another	the	very	traits	one	
might	not	want	to	recognize	under	self-scrutiny”	(63).	Which	is	why	the	presence	of	Joan	is	
so	interesting,	for	not	only	does	she	mirror	many	of	Esther’s	identifying	attributes,	but	she	
is	also	attracted	to	women	(Plath	218).	Joan	thus	opens	up	the	space	for	an	identification,	in	
a	way	that	Esther’s	previously	depicted	friendships	with	other	women	could	not.	The	
triangulation	of	Esther,	Joan,	and	Buddy	and	would	be	ample	enough	evidence	for	a	queer	
reading	even	if	Joan	did	not	engage	in	sex	with	women.	Buddy	represents	a	crux	between	
the	two	women,	the	heterosexual	object	onto	which	Esther	and	Joan	can	affix	queer	desires	
for	one	another.	Eve	Sedgwick	discusses	Réne	Girard’s	theory	of	homosexual	triangulation,	
which	renders	“the	bond	between	two	rivals	in	an	erotic	triangle	as	being	even	stronger,	
more	heavily	determinant	of	actions	and	choices,	than	anything	in	the	bond	between	either	
of	the	lovers	and	the	beloved”	(708).	In	a	story	in	Freud’s	Interpretation	of	Dreams	(1900)	a	
triangle	of	desire	figures	in	the	context	of	a	supper	party,	in	which	a	butcher	desires	his	
wife’s	friend.	Freud	reads	the	butcher’s	wife	as	“a	feminine-identified	heterosexual”	who	is	
only	jealous	of	her	husband’s	desire	(Fuss	31).	Theorists	such	as	Catherine	Clément	and	
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Cynthia	Chase	have	re-figured	the	story	in	different	ways,	but	Fuss	chooses	to	reimagine	it	
as	one	“of	‘between	women,’	with	the	butcher,	at	most,	a	convenient	identificatory	relay	for	
a	socially	prohibited	lesbian	desire”	(31).	To	read	the	triangle	of	Buddy,	Joan,	and	Esther	in	
this	way	means	a	re-working	of	a	classic	Freudian	reading	of	the	jealous	woman.	
Joan	first	appears	earlier	in	the	text	as	the	vehicle	which	delivers	Buddy	to	Esther	
when	he	stops	by	her	dorm	on	the	way	to	“the	Sophomore	Prom	with	Joan”	(Plath	58).	But	
once	Joan	appears	in	the	private	hospital,	Buddy	fades	away	and	a	more	nuanced	
connection	emerges	between	the	women.	Esther	remarks	that	although	she	abhors	Joan’s	
homosexuality,	she	is	fascinated	with	her.	For	Barbara	Johnson,	queerness	between	women	
has	more	to	do	with	“protracted	an	intense	eye	contact	and	involuntary	re-encounters	
ungrounded	in	conscious	positive	feelings”	(162).	This	certainly	holds	with	Joan.	Esther	
wonders	if	Joan,	with	her	“pale,	pebble	eyes”	would	“continue	to	pop	in	at	every	crisis	of	my	
life	to	remind	me	of	what	I	had	been	through”	(Plath	219).	The	text	also	figures	Joan	as	a	
distorted	mirror,	in	which	Esther	can	simultaneously	recognize	their	differences	and	
similarities.	It	is	in	part	what	unconsciously	draws	Esther	to	Joan,	“her	thoughts	were	not	
my	thoughts,	nor	her	feelings	my	feelings,	but	we	were	close	enough	so	that	her	thoughts	
and	feelings	seemed	a	wry,	black	image	of	my	own”	(219).	Which	is	perhaps	is	what	makes	
Esther’s	confusion	about	“what	women	see	in	other	women”	so	humorous—for	in	Joan	she	
sees	herself.	
Esther’s	queer	identification	with	Joan	at	the	private	hospital	also	permits	the	
protracted	fulfillment	of	Marco’s	failed	rape.	Securing	a	diaphragm	through	shopping	
privileges,	Dowbnia	reads	Esther	as	free	“from	an	unwanted	relegation	to	the	domestic	
sphere,”	now	able	to	complete	her	de-flowering	(586).	The	unusualness	of	these	decisions,	
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or	their	inherent	queerness,	should	not	go	unnoticed.	The	cultural	ideology	of	1953	still	
primarily	viewed	women	as	mothers,	on	the	basis	of	what	Nathan	Stormer	describes	as	an	
“enduring	pro-natal	orthodoxy	regarding	maternity	as	woman’s	telos”	(346).	In	a	
proposition	at	a	secret	Planned	Parenthood	conference	on	abortion	in	1955,	psychiatrist	
and	executive	secretary	of	medical	information	at	the	New	York	Academy	of	Medicine	Iago	
Galdston	“declared,	‘A	woman	is	a	uterus	surrounded	by	a	supporting	organism’”	(qtd.	in	
Stormer	346).	Esther	obviously	disagrees,	choosing	instead	to	free	herself	from	the	threat	
of	pregnancy	with	birth	control.	The	decision,	aided	by	Doctor	Nolan	and	the	queer	space	of	
the	private	hospital,	places	her	external	to	dominant	heterosexual	ideology	of	the	1950s.	
Esther	uses	the	birth	control	to	finally	rid	herself	of	her	virginity	by	sleeping	with	a	man	
named	Irwin	by	her	own	agency.	Notably,	Irwin	is	white.	The	intercourse	itself	is	
heterosexual	but	fulfills	a	more	symbolic	than	desirous	purpose.	Esther	bleeds	from	the	
penetration,	but	finally	feels	whole,	“I	couldn’t	possibly	be	a	virgin	anymore…	I	felt	part	of	a	
great	tradition”	(Plath	229).	This	sexual	encounter	is	the	long-protracted	fulfillment	of	the	
rape	and	marking	Esther	was	searching	for	following	her	experience	with	Marco.	Marilyn	
Boyer	constitutes	this	bleeding	as	productive	of	“a	body	of	writing”	through	the	semiotic	
language	of	her	body	(220).	The	“writing”	produced	by	Esther’s	hemorrhaging	tells	the	
rape	narrative	that	her	body	could	not	when	she	was	initially	assaulted.	The	injury	is,	after	
all,	described	as	“one	in	a	million”	by	the	male	doctor	who	treats	Esther	(233).	Though	sex	
with	Irwin	is	literally	heterosexual,	it	remains	queer	through	Esther’s	use	of	it	to	write	her	
own	narrative.	
This	sexual	experience	is	also	queer	in	that	it	also	leads	Esther	to	back	to	Joan	again,	
who	has	since	been	released	from	the	hospital	and	now	lives	in	Boston.	Esther	arrives	at	
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Joan’s	new	apartment	uncontrollably	bleeding,	expecting	Joan	to	admonish	her	for	her	
extra-marital	sex.	Instead,	Joan	retrieves	towels	and	takes	care	of	Esther	with	that	queer	
“tenderness,”	and	Esther	realizes	that	Irwin	and	the	bleeding	are	just	“a	mere	prick	to	her	
pleasure	at	my	arrival”	(Plath	231).	Like	Buddy,	Irwin	is	only	a	heterosexual	vehicle	
(mandated	by	1950s	ideology)	required	for	Joan	and	Esther’s	queer	interaction.	The	scene	
is	by	three	counts	significant:	it	is	a	protracted	fulfillment	of	Esther’s	rape,	an	extremely	
physical	interaction	between	the	two	women,	and	an	effort	to	preserve	life	rather	than	to	
end	it.	Linda	Wagner-Martin	alleges	that	by	“giving	Joan	the	problem	of	saving	her	life”	
Esther	completes	identification	with	Joan,	who	“rather	than	being	a	copy	of	Esther,	now	
finds	herself	an	original,	the	friend	responsible	for	Esther’s	very	life”	(69).	Both	women	
bear	the	burden	of	Esther’s	life	and	body	as	if	belong	to	the	both	of	them.	In	the	emergency	
room	as	the	male	doctor	begins	to	“probe”	Esther’s	vagina,	Joan	stands	by	“rigid	as	a	
soldier,	at	my	side,	holding	my	hand,	for	my	sake	or	hers	I	couldn’t	tell”	(233).	Joan’s	
steadfastness	in	the	hospital	is	significant	as	this	sequence	runs	parallel	to	the	assault	
scene	in	New	York.	When	after	Marco’s	attack	Doreen	disappeared	from	the	country	club	
leaving	Esther	to	slink	home	covering	her	“shoulders	and	bare	breasts,”	Joan	remains	
through	the	entire	ordeal	as	Esther	weathers	the	pain	and	embarrassment	and	a	male	
doctor	handles	her	body	(110).	Through	Joan’s	tender	physical	attention,	queerness	
literally	heals	the	violence	of	heterosexuality,	reinforcing	affection	and	identification	
between	the	two	women.	Both	Esther	and	Joan	have	a	stake	in	the	other,	contradicting	“the	
sensationalized	elements	of	lesbianism”	by	exemplifying	that	tenderness	in	“a	novel,	and	
world,	in	which	so	few	examples	of	that	quality	exist”	(Wagner-Martin	68).	The	
relationship	stands	outside	of	1950s	heterosexual	ideology,	wherein	women	are	pitted	
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against	one	another	in	competition	for	men.	Joan	who	loves	women	and	wants	to	be	a	
psychologist	and	Esther	who	pursues	casual	sex	with	men	and	wants	to	be	a	writer,	stand	
outside	the	1950s	“the	marriage-and-family	machine”	(Donofrio	221).	As	queer	entities	in	a	
heterosexual	society,	their	identification	promotes	the	development	of	both	who	might	be	
stunted	alone.	
Which	is	perhaps	why	it	isn’t	so	shocking	when	Joan	kills	herself,	just	shortly	after	
the	hemorrhaging	episode.	The	text	places	the	scene	in	the	emergency	room	and	Joan’s	
death	in	close	quarters	which	inevitably	“suggests	a	cause-and-effect	relationship”	
(Wagner-Martin	69).	Esther	gravitates	towards	that	suspicion	immediately,	but	Doctor	
Nolan	pushes	her	away	from.	Doctor	Nolan	is	correct.	Joan’s	suicide	should	be	read	as	the	
only	viable	means	to	which	a	queer	relationship	can	be	taken	in	a	text	set	in	1953	and	
bound	by	the	ideologies	of	the	time.	In	No	Future:	Queer	Theory	and	the	Death	Drive,	Lee	
Edelman	argues	that	“queerness	exposes	sexuality’s	inevitable	coloration	by	the	[death]	
drive”	through	its	“rejection	of	spiritualization	through	marriage	to	reproductive	futurism”	
(27).	If	heteronormativity	is	fixed	upon	the	issue	of	reproduction,	and	homosexuality	is	its	
inverse,	locating	queerness	in	the	gaps,	the	endings,	and	the	failure	of	the	marriage	plot.	As	
having	sex	with	Irwin	finally	completed	Esther’s	losing	her	virginity,	Joan’s	suicide	
indicates	a	completion	or	fulfillment	of	Esther’s	suicide.	Joan	takes	her	own	life	“in	the	
woods,	by	the	frozen	pond”	(Plath	235).	The	locale	is	no	accident,	spectacularly	mirroring	
Esther’s	suicidal	movement	towards	nature.	It	also	brings	the	return	of	Buddy,	who	seeks	
to	sneak	himself	back	into	the	long-vanished	triangle	of	desire.	When	he	and	Esther	meet	
again,	she	braces	for	lingering	desire	or	emotion	and	instead	feels	“Nothing	but	a	great,	
amiable	boredom”	(238).	Now	that	Buddy	is	excluded	from	the	triangulation,	Esther	
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escapes	the	heterosexual	complex	of	the	fifties.	Buddy	asks	Esther,	“Do	you	think	there’s	
something	in	me	that	drives	women	crazy?”	to	which	Esther	laughs	and	responds,	“You	had	
nothing	to	do	with	us,	Buddy”	(239-240).	The	marked	used	of	“us”	effectively	cuts	the	
heterosexual	out	of	the	equation	once	and	for	all.	Budick	posits	Joan’s	death	as	Plath	
“sealing	off	the	lesbian	option”	and	Esther	wedding	herself	to	the	masculine	world	(883).	
Perhaps	Joan’s	suicide	closes	off	the	potential	for	embodied	lesbian	sexuality,	but	it	opens	
up	the	space	for	the	queer	to	flow	into	Esther’s	development,	set	going	by	the	queer	climax	
of	death.	Where	Esther	has	previously	approached	desire	for	other	women	in	terms	of	
being	the	one	consumed	(the	Russian	woman	translator,	Doreen’s	bones,	her	mother’s	
basement),	this	identification	is	a	parallel	exchange.	
At	the	end	of	the	novel,	Esther	prepares	for	her	own	release	from	the	hospital	and	
she	attends	Joan’s	funeral.	Esther	watches	Joan’s	casket	being	lowered	into	the	earth	and	
reflects	on	the	past	six	months—“I	remembered	the	cadavers	and	Doreen	and	the	story	of	
the	fig	tree	and	Marco’s	diamond…”	(Plath	237).	Not	only	does	she	remember,	but	she	
resists	forgetting,	citing	the	experiences	as	“part	of	me.	They	were	my	landscape”	(237).	
Esther	has	incorporated	her	traumas	and	experiences	into	a	new	subjectivity,	new	
landscape,	new	self,	through	the	natural	world	which	she	returned	to	through	her	suicides.	
This	imagery	is	particularly	potent	as	she	watches	her	double’s	entombment.	Esther	
wonders,	“what	I	thought	I	was	burying”	(242).	Overtly,	Esther	is	burying	herself	by	
burying	her	other,	engaged	Fuss’s	assertion	that	“All	active	identifications,	including	
positive	ones,	are	monstrous	assassinations:	the	Other	is	murdered	and…	incorporated	
before	being	entombed	inside	the	subject”	(Fuss	34).	As	Joan	mitigated	Esther’s	protracted	
sexual	marking,	as	does	Joan	mitigate	Esther’s	“repetition	and	remembrance”	of	
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identification	(34).	As	a	fulfillment	of	a	queer	narrative	and	identification	in	the	context	of	
the	1950s,	Joan’s	burial	represents	the	final	consummation/consumption	of	identification.	
In	the	site	of	the	graveyard,	now	confronted	with	her	double	rather	than	the	father,	
Esther’s	body	once	again	speaks	the	language	of	the	semiotic.	Esther	reflects	on	the	flowers	
by	the	grave,	the	lawns	covered	in	pure	white	snow,	and	turns	inward	towards	her	body,	
towards	herself:	“I	took	a	deep	breath	and	listened	to	the	old	brag	of	my	heart.	I	am,	I	am,	I	
am”	(Plath	243).		
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Chapter	II:	Queer	Inversions,	Black	Hollows	in	Toni	Morrison’s	Sula	
“In	many	ways	the	Freudian	paradigm	implicitly	depends	on	the	presence	of	
the	black	female	other.	One	of	its	more	problematic	aspects	is	that	in	doing	
so	it	relegates	black	women’s	sexuality	to	the	irreducibly	abnormal	category	
in	which	there	are	no	distinctions	between	homosexual	and	heterosexual	
women.”	
Evelynn	Hammonds,	“Black	(W)holes	and	the	Geometry	of	Black	Female	
Sexuality”	
	
Sula	doubly	depicts	the	displaced	and	de-centered	bildungsroman	along	the	axis	of	
race	and	gender.	Literary	critic	and	Morrison	scholar,	Pin-chia	Feng	warns	that	reading	
Toni	Morrison’s	works	as	bildungsroman	poses	an	“inherent	risk”	of	allocating	socially	and	
politically	specific	texts	to	a	“quintessential	western	bourgeois	(male)	genre”	(40).	Not	only	
do	the	race	and	gender	positions	of	Sula’s	characters	problematize	its	genre,	but	as	well	its	
double	protagonists	do	as	well.	Sula	follows	the	development	of	two	young	Black	women,	
Nel	Wright	and	Sula	Peace.	The	literary	double	is	an	oft	implemented	trope,	but	also	one	of	
“psychological	necessity”	in	novels	of	development	according	to	Linda	Wagner-Martin	(62).	
Sula	is	not	a	story	about	two	characters’	parallel	developments,	but	a	developmental	plot	
with	two	subjects:	a	“double	bildungsroman”	according	to	Feng.	Nel	and	Sula	grow	in	terms	
of	one	another,	inhabiting	a	dual	selfhood	integral	to	the	subjective	selves	of	each.	Sula	is	
not	the	first	novel	to	depict	the	double	in	a	coming	of	age	tale.	But	it	is	also	not	the	first	
novel	about	young	Black	women	to	depict	the	double.	It	is	nonetheless	a	potent	example	of	
a	de-centered	bildungsroman	plotted	along	the	lines	of	identification.	Nel	and	Sula’s	
doubling	integrates	and	expands	upon	what	Plath	concluded	in	her	undergraduate	English	
thesis	on	Fyodor	Dostoevsky:	“recognition	of	our	various	mirror	images	and	reconciliation	
with	them	will	save	us	from	disintegration”	(qtd.	in	Wagner-Martin	63).	As	young	Black	
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women,	Nel	and	Sula’s	interdependent	identification	and	doubling	is	more	theoretically	
provocative	than	that	of	Dostoevsky’s	protagonists	because	of	the	significant	trouble	of	
being	a	Black	woman	in	the	context	of	white	American	cultural	ideology.	
Identification	is	more	critical,	more	fluidly	examined,	and	more	meaningful	for	the	
two	young	Black	protagonists	of	Sula.	Diana	Fuss,	white	woman,	deals	predominantly	with	
white	narratives.	But	in	the	final	chapter	of	Identification	Papers,	Fuss	addresses	the	
colonial	history	of	identification,	drawing	heavily	from	work	by	Caribbean	psychiatrist	and	
philosopher	Frantz	Fanon.	Her	identification	theory	relies	on	Sigmund	Freud’s	conception	
of	self/other,	a	dichotomy	which	places	Blackness	inverse	to	whiteness.	Fuss	asserts	that	
“colonialism	may	inflict	its	greatest	physical	violence	precisely	by	attempting	to	exclude	
blacks	from	the	very	self-other	dynamic	that	makes	subjectivity	possible”	(142).	The	
colonized	are	required	to	maintain	a	position	as	a	non-white	as	well	as	assimilate	to	a	
white,	European	cultural	norms	at	the	same	time.	The	Black	subject	in	America	is	always	
already	other,	stuck	in	a	deadlock	of	“difference	and	similitude,”	situated	“at	the	vanishing	
point	of	subjectivity”	(146).	Therefore,	identification	becomes	paramount	in	constructing	
selfhood	for	Nel	and	Sula.	Scholar	of	Black	feminist	theory,	Barbara	Smith,	reads	the	
bonding	of	Nel	and	Sula	is	an	example	of	Black	women’s	bonding	which	has	“always”	taken	
place	“for	the	sake	of	barest	survival”	(139).	Smith	is	the	first	to	argue	for	the	application	of	
a	specific	lens	of	critical	theory	and	ideology	to	the	writing	of	Black	women.	Smith	believes	
that	both	sexual	and	nonsexual	relationships	between	women	constitute	a	valuable	aspect	
of	Black	women’s	literature	(137).	Finding	solace	in	another	who	faces	the	same	racial	and	
gender	oppression	is	critical	for	the	young	Black	female	protagonist.	When	they	first	meet	
as	children,	Nel	and	Sula	have	already	discovered	their	othering:	“they	were	neither	white	
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nor	male”	(Sula	52).	To	combat	this,	they	“set	about	creating	something	else	to	be”	through	
identification	with	one	another	(52).	
In	Black	women’s	vernacular,	the	term	girlfriend	can	refer	to	any	close	woman	
friend	or	confidante	whether	platonic	and	sexual.	The	term	is	thus	quite	apt	here	for	its	
encompassment	of	a	variety	of	female	relationships.	Kevin	Everod	Quashie	indicates	that	
“the	girlfriend	is	someone	who	makes	it	possible	for	a	Black	woman	to	bring	all	of	herself	
into	consideration,	to	imagine	herself	wild	and	adventurous,	but	also	safely	and	of	the	
shore”	(190).	The	Black	girlfriend	(or	playmate,	sister,	cousin)	is	she	who	understands	in	
sharing	the	same	experience	of	oppression,	the	same	axis	of	identity.	Kyla	Wazana	
Tompkins,	in	“Intersections	of	Race,	Gender,	and	Sexuality,”	references	the	term	“mati”	in	
the	Surinamese	language,	which	colloquially	means	“same-sex	lover”	but	etymologically	
comes	from	“the	term	‘shipmate,’	as	in	‘s/he	who	survived	the	middle	passage	with	me’”	
(175).	One	thinks	of	Zadie	Smith’s	characterization	of	adolescence	as	its	own	“middle	
passage”	in	Swing	Time	(2016)	(214).	The	girlfriend	is	a	critical	feature	of	Black	women’s	
writing	and	Black	feminist	theory.	Deborah	E.	McDowell	indicates	that	because	“white	
women,	white	men,	and	Black	men	consider	their	experiences	as	normative,”	Black	women	
writers	have	been	forced	to	make	their	own	spaces	in	order	to	build	subjectivity	(168).	The	
Black	girlfriend	might	be	read	as	the	very	embodiment	of	Black	feminist	theory,	a	
necessary	relationship	in	defining	oneself	outside	of	what	is	considered	“normative”	by	
white	supremacy	and	through	sexism.	Quashie	maintains	their	relationship	creates	the	
space	for	“a	kind	of	‘selfishness’,”	in	opposition	to	“the	social	imperative	for	Black	women	
to	be	selfless,”	which	allows	for	the	fostering	of	their	individual	subjectivities	(188).	In	
essence,	friendship	between	Black	women	opens	up	a	space	for	identifications	specific	to	
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lived	experience.	
Some	critics	are	content	to	read	Sula	in	terms	of	platonic	friendship.	White	lesbian	
critic	Barbara	Johnson,	referring	somewhat	facetiously	to	her	“inner	lesbo-meter,”	feels	
Sula	“does	not	work”	as	a	queer	text	for	“while	the	relationship	is	certainly	overinvested,	it	
is	also	abundantly	explained”	(162).	For	Johnson,	the	grounding	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	need	for	
one	another	bars	eroticism.	Deborah	McDowell	also	shies	from	a	queer	reading	of	the	text,	
believing	a	lesbian	perspective	on	Sula	is	reductive	of	the	novel’s	“skillful	blend	of	folklore,	
omens,	and	dreams,	its	metaphorical	and	symbolic	richness”	(170).	Alternately,	critics	such	
as	Kevin	Everod	Quashie	(“The	Other	Dancer	as	Self:	Girlfriend	Selfhood”),	Kathryn	
Stockton	(“Heaven’s	Bottom:	Anal	Economics”),	and	famously	Barbara	Smith	(“Toward	a	
Black	Feminist	Criticism”),	maintain	that	Nel	and	Sula’s	relationship	is	an	inherently	queer	
one.	Still	others,	such	as	that	of	Diane	Gillespie	and	Missy	Dehn	Kubitschek,	skirt	the	issue	
entirely,	directing	the	reader	to	the	aforementioned	Barbara	Smith	for	“an	interpretation	of	
Sula	as	a	lesbian	novel”	(41-42).		It	is	the	position	of	this	thesis	to	agree	with	the	second	
group.	Although	Sula	and	Nel’s	relationship	may	not	be	explicitly	homosexual,	their	intense	
spiritual	valences	and	resistance	to	heterosexual	norms	positions	them	as	queer.	Evelynn	
Hammonds	contends	that	because	Black	female	queerness	has	been	“doubly	silenced,”	it	
must	be	located	in	the	gaps	in	the	text	(129).	Queerness	pokes	its	head	up	in	criticism	of	the	
heterosexual	or	bolstering	of	female	relationships.	Morrison’s	consistently	cynical	portraits	
of	heterosexual	unions	and	emphasis	on	Nel	and	Sula’s	relationship	place	Sula	into	the	
theoretical	space	of	the	queer.	
Queerness	is	also	a	necessary	component	of	the	self/other	identification	exchange.	
Much	of	Fuss’s	re-interpretation	interrogates	Freud’s	claim	that	“desire	for	one	sex	is	
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always	secure	through	identification	with	the	other	sex,”	mandating	heterosexuality	in	
order	to	keep	the	two	terms	separate	(11).	A	rigid	gender	binary	thus	forms	the	theoretical	
“lynchpin”	between	Freud’s	homosocial	and	homosexual	behaviors.	By	Freud’s	contention,	
confusion	of	identification	with	desire	results	in	homosexual	desire.	Freud	prescribes	his	
female	patient	in	“Psychogenesis	of	a	Case	of	Homosexuality,”	with	the	confused	
identification	outlined	by	Fuss	as:	“wanting	to	be	a	mother”	vs.	“wanting	to	have	a	mother”	
(62).	Freud	still	portrays	desire	for	the	mother	in	heterosexual	terms	as	a	latent	Oedipal	
desire	for	the	father.	But	surprisingly,	Freud	also	determines	that	this	study	indicates	a	
“considerable	measure	of	latent	or	unconscious	homosexuality”	in	all	“normal	people”	(qtd.	
in	Fuss	62).	This	conclusion	contradicts	Freud’s	usual	theory	and	concedes	that	
homosexuality	may	be	more	linked	to	identification	than	he	reports.	Fuss	enters	the	text	at	
this	strange	concession	to	detail	her	belief	that	the	psychological	experience	of	
identification	and	desire	“cannot	be	securely	separated	or	easily	prevented	from	turning	
back	on	one	another”	(77).	In	other	words,	Fuss	believes	that	all	identifications	are	
inherently	desirous.	Therefore,	interpreting	Sula	through	the	lens	of	identification	rests	on	
reading	Nel	and	Sula	as	queer	characters.	
Queering	Nel	and	Sula	also	supports	rendering	identification	within	and	de-
centering	the	trajectory	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	dual	development.	Reading	their	relationship	as	
queer	also	has	theoretical	use	in	untangling	the	fraught	territory	of	Black	women’s	
sexuality.	As	Kyle	Wazana	Tompkins	reveals	“to	be	black”	in	the	context	of	American	
history	of	chattel	slavery,	is	“to	be	always	already	sexualized…	and	therefore	to	be	always	
and	already	deviant”	(174).	This	designation	victimizes	all	Black	Americans,	but	in	
particular	it	hinders	the	sexual	agency	of	Black	women	through	hegemonic	objectification.	
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Evelynn	Hammonds,	scientist	and	scholar	of	African	American	feminism,	discusses	how	
white	American	ideology	has	always	“already	colonized”	Black	women’s	bodies;	a	body	
which	“has	so	much	sexual	potential	that	it	has	none	at	all”	(129).	Ideology	perceives	the	
Black	American	woman’s	body	as	the	“embodiment	of	sex,”	silencing	her	individual	sexual	
agency	(129).	Hammonds	calls	for	a	more	holistic	engagement	of	Black	feminist	sexuality,	
foregrounding	the	positive	and	pleasurable,	and	locating	queerness	for	Black	women	as	a	
site	“where	black	female	desire	is	expressed”	(132).	Queerness	thus	constructs	a	space	of	
discursive	sexuality	free	from	sexism	and	white	supremacy.	Critics	often	view	Nel	and	Sula	
as	opposites	and	Sula	as	a	text	about	women’s	differences.	Marie	Nigro	characterizes	Sula	
as	“the	impulsive,	emotional	one”	and	Nel	as	frigid:	“the	practical	one”	(727).	Similarly,	Pin-
chia	Feng	remarks	that	“Nel	regards	herself	as	a	‘good’	black	woman	since	she	abides	
faithfully	by	the	values	of	her	community.	Sula,	on	the	other	hand,	resists	conformity	and	
questions	this	arbitrary	division”	(79).	It	is	tempting	to	read	figures	of	the	double	through	
Angel/Devil,	Virgin/Whore	dichotomies.	But	there	is	little	nuance	to	categorically	
difference	Sula	and	Nel.	A	queer	reading	assuages	this	tension	by	pairing	Nel	and	Sula	
together	as	two	interdependent	agents	who	borrow	and	reject	pieces	of	one	another.	
Queerness	in	Sula	is	established	via	the	erotic	natural	imagery	of	the	Bottom.	Nel	
and	Sula	meet	in	dreams	before	ever	connecting	in	the	real	world.	Isolated	only	daughters	
of	absent	fathers	and	distant	mothers,	both	imagined	“a	presence,	a	someone,	who,	quite	
like	the	dreamer,	shared	the	delight	of	the	dream”	(Sula	51).	Both	girls	hope	for	an	erotic	
“someone”	to	confide	in.	Nel	dreams	of	a	“fiery	prince,”	Sula	images	herself	“on	a	gray-and-
white	horse”	(51,	52).	Each	wish	for	someone	who	will	fill	the	empty	spaces	of	her	lonely	
childhood.	Lorraine	Bethel	reads	an	inherent	“sensuality	in	their	interactions”	(qtd.	in	B.	
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Smith	139).	Morrison’s	dewy	language	encourages	eroticism	and	situates	Nel	and	Sula’s	
“wish”	for	the	other	as	closer	to	desire.	Nel	and	Sula’s	meetings	all	take	place	in	a	
summertime	“limp	with	the	weight	of	blossomed	things”	(Sula	56).	In	the	summer	of	1922,	
they	discover	adolescent	heterosexuality	together—“the	summer	of	the	beautiful	black	
boys”	(56).	On	“the	second	Saturday	in	June”	in	1927,	Nel	gets	married	and	Sula	leaves	the	
Bottom	for	ten	years	(84).	When	Sula	returns	to	Medallion	as	an	adult	in	1937,	Nel	
describes	the	particular	“sheen”	of	the	spring,	“a	glimmering	as	of	green,	rain-soaked	
Saturday	nights…	of	lemon-yellow	afternoons	bright	with	iced	drinks	and	splashes	of	
daffodils”	(94).	Annis	Pratt,	in	Archetypal	Patterns	in	Women’s	Fiction	believes	that	nature	
figures	prominently	in	the	development	of	the	young	female	protagonist:	“Visions	of	her	
own	world	within	the	natural	world,	or	naturistic	epiphanies,	channel	the	young	girl’s	
protests	into	a	fantasy	where	her	imprisoned	energies	can	be	released”	(17).	Nature	and	
summer	are	integral	characteristics	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	identification.	The	natural	returns	
when	they	reunite	in	adulthood,	signaling	that	despite	the	ten	years	of	absence,	their	
identification	persists.	Pratt	also	specifies	the	eroticism	of	nature,	identifying	the	figure	of	
Eros	or	the	“green-world	lover”	who	inhabits	the	childhood	realm	of	the	natural	(16).	For	
Nel	and	Sula,	this	is	an	apt	characterization.	But	Pratt’s	work	is	outdated	and	insufficient	in	
that	she	fails	to	include	any	significant	attention	to	race	in	her	work.	
Vashti	Crutcher	Lewis,	in	“African	Tradition	in	Toni	Morrison’s	Sula,”	reads	Sula	in	
terms	of	West	African	river	worship.	Lewis’s	interpretation	provides	a	race	specific	reading	
of	nature	to	satisfy	the	shortcomings	of	Pratt’s	text.	She	proposes	that	in	bearing	
ontological	connections	to	local	madman	and	pariah,	Shadrack,	Sula	maintains	a	“spiritual	
presence	in	nature”	as	the	figure	of	an	African	river	goddess	(95).	Shadrack	is	a	shell-
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shocked	veteran	of	WWI	who	makes	his	living	as	a	fisherman	by	the	river.	Lewis	makes	
several	comparisons	which	link	Shadrack	to	a	nature-based	African	spirituality.	West	
African	river	spirits	“are	said	to	look	like	men	but	their	feet	and	hands	are	different”	(93).	
When	Shadrack	appears	at	the	beginning	of	the	text,	he	has	difficulty	controlling	his	hands,	
which	“grow	in	a	higgledy-piggledy	fashion”	and	shrink	down	again	(Sula	9).	They	are	only	
calmed	when	he	finds	his	reflection	and	his	“grave	black	face”	in	the	water	of	a	toilet	bowl	
(13).	Not	only	does	this	scene	reinforce	Shadrack’s	connection	to	water,	but	it	introduces	
mirroring	and	comfort	in	Blackness	as	integral	to	identification	in	the	text.	Sula	and	
Shadrack’s	connection	manifests	during	a	scene	at	the	river.	Nel	and	Sula	play	digging	holes	
with	a	fervor	akin	to	orgasm,	“they	stroked	the	blades	up	and	down…	she	grew	impatient	
and	poked	her	twig	rhythmically	and	intensely	into	the	earth…	together	they	worked	until	
the	two	holes	were	one	and	the	same”	(Sula	58).	Replicating	each	other’s	the	movements,	
Nel	and	Sula	penetrate	the	earth	individually	but	in	tandem	with	one	another,	until	their	
holes	are	one	and	the	same.	This	ecstatic	mirroring	expresses	both	identification	and	queer	
desire.	Ronnie	Scharfman’s	colloquial	outline	of	Lacanian	theory	details	that	the	structure	
of	mirroring	is	based	upon	“the	‘regard,’	and	its	analogues,	such	as	echo,	reflection,	or	
dream”	(90).	“Regard”	is	what	makes	existence	conceivable,	for	an	“other”	to	mirror	the	
movements	of	the	“self”	is	to	prove	that	the	“self”	is	moving	in	the	first	place—and	
therefore	exists.	Kevin	Everod	Quashie	reads	the	scene	as	a	“surrender	to	the	girlfriend:	a	
meeting	of	one’s	(other)	self	at	the	river”	(193).	Nel	and	Sula	meet	one	another	as	the	self,	
melding	their	holes	together.	
Following	the	digging	play,	Nel	and	Sula	begin	to	play	with	another,	younger	child	
named	Chicken	Little.	Sula	swings	him	around	by	the	arms,	until	he	“slipped	from	her	
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hands	and	sailed	away	over	the	water”	sinking	underneath	the	surface	of	the	river	as	Nel	
watches	(Sula	60).	Frozen	with	fear,	both	girls	notice	that	Shadrack	has	been	watching.	Sula	
rushes	over	to	his	shack,	where	Shadrack	consoles	Sula	with	just	the	word	“always,”	the	
answer	to	“a	question	she	had	not	asked”	(63).	Eighteen	years	later	on	Sula’s	deathbed,	the	
prophecy	is	fulfilled	as	she	dreams	of	water	and	wonders,	“Who	was	it	that	had	promised	
her	a	sleep	of	water	always?”	(149).	The	structuring	of	the	death	of	Chicken	Little	alongside	
the	first	meeting	of	Sula	and	Shadrack,	and	this	prophetic	sleep	of	water,	further	outlines	
the	West	African	religious	valences	of	Vashti	Crutcher	Lewis’s	argument.	Lewis	reads	
Chicken	Little’s	drowning	a	sacrifice:	“it	was	not	uncommon	for	children	to	be	sacrificed	to	
the	river	gods	in	Africa,	throughout	the	Bight	of	Benin”	(93).	Sula	and	Shadrack’s	meeting	
immediately	following	his	death	further	construct	the	scene	as	a	sacrificial	one.	It	is	the	
moment	that	Shadrack	acknowledges	Sula	as	a	fellow	water	spirit,	with	whom	he	has	a	
“spiritual	marriage	and	kinship,”	reminding	her	that	she	too	will	face	a	death	by	water	(93).	
The	characterization	of	Chicken	Little’s	death	as	a	spiritual	sacrifice	grounded	in	nature,	
contributing	to	a	queer	reading	of	the	scene.	For	although	Lewis’s	reading	structures	itself	
around	Sula	and	Shadrack,	Nel	is	also	an	agent	in	Chicken	Little’s	death.	Chicken	Little’s	
interruption	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	mirrored,	erotic	digging	leads	to	his	murder:	“an	unspeakable	
restlessness	and	agitation	held	them.	At	the	same	instant	each	girl	heard	footsteps	in	the	
grass”	(59).	Chicken	Little	serves	as	a	heterosexual	intruder,	portending	the	maternal	roles	
that	lie	in	wait	for	the	girls	if	they	veer	from	a	queer	path.	In	“Dead	Boys	and	Adolescent	
Girls,”	Pamela	Thurschwell	quotes	Lisa	Williams,	who	believes	that	that	Chicken	Little’s	
death	buries	“the	encroaching	adult	emphasis	on	heterosexual	relations	as	opposed	to	
female	friendship”	(121).	In	retaliation,	Nel	and	Sula	ritually	sacrifice	Chicken	Little	to	the	
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river.	
The	queer	space	of	the	Bottom	also	mitigates	Nel	and	Sula’s	identification.	The	town	
rests	on	the	premise	of	inversion.	White	farmers	tricked	the	original	inhabitants	of	the	
Bottom	into	settling	the	less	fertile	hilltop	by	calling	it	“the	bottom	of	heaven,”	prompting	
the	townspeople	to	nickname	the	community	“the	Bottom	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	it	was	up	
in	the	hills”	(Sula	4).	The	Bottom,	more	neighborhood	than	town,	is	a	haven	of	Blackness,	
where	Black	assumes	the	unmarked	category	and	the	white	gaze	is	geographically	
inverted:	“every	day	they	could	literally	look	down	on	the	white	folks”	who	lived	in	the	
valley	(5).	The	Bottom’s	downward	mobility	as	a	Black	working	class	community	also	
incites	a	gender	inversion.	Kathryn	Bond	Stockton,	in	her	text	“Heaven’s	Bottom:	Anal	
Economics	and	the	Critical	Debasement	of	Freud	in	Toni	Morrison’s	Sula,”	reads	the	Bottom	
in	a	position	of	anality	based	on	the	incompatibility	of	American	capitalism	with	its	Black	
“Bottom”	class.	Stockton	theorizes	that	the	white	American	capitalist	state’s	preclusion	of	
Black	men	from	prototypically	male	employment	engenders	emasculation	as	well	as	the	
regressive	economics	of	the	Bottom.	Black	men	are	passed	over	for	manual	labor	and	
emasculated	by	service	jobs,	like	Nel’s	eventual	husband	Jude	Green—“a	waiter	hanging	
around	a	kitchen	like	a	woman”—Black	women	have	always	been	able	to	find	work	(Sula	
82).	The	Black	men	of	the	Bottom	(and	throughout	America)	are	denied	access	to	white	
male	masculinity	through	labor.	In	contrast,	white	economics	afford	Black	women	plentiful	
employment	opportunities	in	domestic	labor.	Unlike	the	privatized	domestic	duties	of	the	
average	mid-century	white	woman,	Black	women	“have	been	blocked	from	(the	bourgeois	
ideal	of)	white	feminine	passivity”	and	consistently	“tied	to	production	circuits	in	dominant	
economies”	(Stockton	95).	Black	women	are	denied	access	to	constructions	of	white	female	
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femininity.	Stockton	contends	that	through	this	reversal,	“Morrison’s	black	women	become	
the	anal	penetrators	of	the	novel’s	black	men”	(88).	Characterizing	women	as	penetrating	
men	is	strikingly	queer	against	the	ideology	of	white,	heterosexist	society.	The	Bottom	thus	
becomes	an	upside	down,	queer	space.	The	domestic	spaces	of	the	Bottom	are	female-
headed,	positioning	Black	women	on	“top”	in	the	anal	metaphor	of	Stockton.	The	power	
structures	of	white	gender	fail	in	Black	communities;	excluding	Black	men	and	women	
from	the	heterosexual	narrative	of	white	ideology	and	constructing	the	Bottom	as	queer.	
The	Bottom	represents,	with	devastating	precision,	how	Black	families	“fail”	to	fit	
into	the	American	capitalist	paradigm	of	heterosexual	family	structure.	Many	ethnographic	
studies,	such	as	the	1965	Moynihan	Report,	have	presented	the	idea	that	“strong	black	
women	make	black	men	weak,”	blaming	Black	women	for	oppressing	their	men	and	Black	
men	for	not	oppressing	their	women	(Stockton	97).	A	Black	household	headed	by	a	woman	
is	seen	as	feminizing,	debasing,	and	“proof”	of	a	failure	to	be	upwardly	mobile.	But	Black	
masculinity	in	Morrison’s	novels	says	something	different,	portraying	Black	men	as	“bodies	
who	wear	(in	the	sense	of	genital	as	clothes)	the	failed	promise	of	a	dominant	sign”	(98).	
Promised	the	gender	supremacy	of	being	male	but	denied	that	position	because	of	their	
race,	Black	men	are	let	down	over	and	over	again	by	white	heterosexual	ideals.	Promised	
gainful,	non-debasing	employment	by	American	culture	and	given	nothing,	Black	
masculinity	looks	like	femininity	because	it	is	set	up	to	fail.	Black	men	as	well	as	Black	
women	become	queered	in	the	absence	of	their	promised	gender	destinies—composing	the	
Bottom	as	queer	space.	Morrison	posits	the	Bottom	as	an	“alternate,	anal	economy,”	
outside	of	the	“white	capitalist	complex,”	where	the	downwardly	mobile,	the	queer,	fixation	
on	the	anal,	seems	to	be	the	key	to	identification	(85).	The	citizens	of	the	Bottom	are	
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required	to	fit	into	a	white	American	standard	of	masculinity	and	femininity	by	a	white	
capitalist	economy	but	barred	from	entry	by	the	same	ideology.	The	Bottom	becomes	a	
queer	space,	outside	of	the	white,	heterosexual	nation-state	which	Tompkins	believes	to	
both	produce	and	obscure	“populations	of	color	as	always	and	already	non-
heteronormative	and	sexually	deviant”	(177).	Dominant	ideology	will	always	perceive	the	
incompatibility	of	Black	men	and	women	with	the	formations	of	white,	capitalist,	
heterosexual	citizenship	as	deviant.	
The	Bottom,	with	its	alternative	anal	economy	and	“regressive”	Black	men,	per	
white	capitalist	standards	produces	a	queer	Black	society	outside	of	prescribed	norms.	The	
Bottom	is	both	within	Medallion	and	within	capitalist	America,	but	also	external	to	it.	As	a	
space	of	queer	non-existence,	it	provides	the	perfect	site	for	the	growth	of	Black	female	
queerness.	Evelynn	Hammonds,	feminist	scholar	and	physicist,	describes	Black	lesbian	
sexuality	in	terms	of	a	black	hole:	an	“empty	place	in	space”	which	is	actually	“dense	and	
full”	(128,	133).	Because	Black	female	queerness	is	silenced	by	ideology	and	so	often	
invisible	in	text,	its	discernment	relies	on	reading	what	circles	around	it.	In	agreement	with	
Stockton’s	theory,	this	stages	the	Bottom	as	a	space	which	fosters	Black	female	queerness,	
and	therefore	identification.	The	Bottom	is	literally	collapsing.	Stockton	illustrates	this	
through	the	downward	movement	of	the	town,	when	the	Black	community	literally	moves	
down	the	hill	and	the	“white	rich	folks	from	the	valley	move	up”	(85).	Where	a	black	hole’s	
collapse	results	from	the	darkness	of	space	absorbing	the	light	of	a	star,	the	Bottom	
collapses	in	the	opposite	color	direction;	white	gentrification	replacing	a	Black	community.	
Karin	Luisa	Badt	invokes	the	opening	of	the	novel	which	describes	the	literal	uprooting	of	
the	Bottom:	“Where	they	tore	the	nightshade	and	blackberry	patches…”	(Sula	3).	Badt	
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holds	that	rootlessness	results	from	“racist	oppression”	and	the	downward	mobility	of	the	
Bottom	results	from	“racist	politics”	(569).	The	displacement	of	the	Bottom	operates	as	a	
second	colonization.	The	Bottom	is	a	void	space,	a	doubly-silenced	by	the	white	
heteronormative	suburbs	which	replace	it.	Figured	as	a	black	hole,	it	is	also	a	physical	
manifestation	of	Black	female	queerness	which	allows	the	theoretical	space	for	Nel	and	
Sula’s	identification.	
At	first	as	children,	a	great	deal	of	their	identification	relies	on	each	other’s	families.	
Both	girls	find	“in	each	other	the	intimacy	they	were	looking	for”	and	what	was	missing	
from	their	home	lives	(Sula	52).	Diane	Gillespie	and	Missy	Dehn	Kubitschek	assert	that	Nel	
and	Sula	provide	what	the	other	“the	lacks	in	their	mother-daughter	relationships”	(40).	
Nel	provides	Sula,	with	a	center,	and	Sula	provides	Nel	with	expansiveness.	Identification	is	
not	so	simple,	however.	As	each	girl	grows	older,	she	must	reckon	the	identifications	with	
her	maternal	ancestors.	Nel	and	Sula’s	relationship	facilitates	confrontation	of	the	sexual	
politics	and	generational	traumas	of	their	female	ancestors.	But	at	the	same	time,	latent	
familial	identifications	threaten	the	queer	one	between	the	girls.	In	Identification	Papers,	
Diana	Fuss	details	the	story	of	a	group	of	sons	murdering	and	then	cannibalizing	their	
father	from	Freud’s	Totem	and	Taboo	(1913)	(32).	Fuss	uses	the	narrative	to	illustrate	the	
repetitive	violence	of	the	murder	and	then	the	incorporation	of	“multiple	and	contradictory	
identifications”	(34).	To	incorporate	an	identification	with	an	object	(in	particular	a	
parental	figure)	that	the	subject	both	loves	and	hates,	identification	must	be	repeated	over	
and	over	again.	
In	Sula,	this	manifests	in	Nel	and	Sula’s	relationships	with	their	mothers	and	
grandmothers.	Louise	Bernikow,	in	Among	Women,	asserts	that	Sula	“is	not	a	novel	about	
	
	 61	
the	viciousness	of	women.	It	is,	instead,	about	not	knowing,	about	the	ways	women	deny	
their	love	for	one	another,	within	the	family	and	between	friends”	(55).	This	is	true,	but	
Bernikow	pays	little	notice	to	the	specificities	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	cultural	political	contexts	
which	coerce	the	denial	of	love.	It	is	not	a	novel	about	female	viciousness,	it	is	a	novel	about	
a	world	where	Black	women	must	perpetuate	viciousness	and	negotiate	their	love	both	for	
one	another	and	themselves.	While	it	may	be	true,	as	Pin-Chia	Feng	reasons	that	“the	
repetition	of	the	maternal	discourse	sets	up	an	important	network	of	relations	as	well	as	
limitations	for	the	self-creation	of	a	woman	of	color,”	it	is	also	easy	to	mis-read	this	(81).	
Relationships	between	female	family	members	in	Sula	are	indeed	critical	to	the	self-
creation	of	Nel	and	Sula	and	dependent	on	the	social	context	of	all	the	characters.	But	it	
would	be	remiss	to	fall	into	an	analysis	that	characterizes	the	limitations	of	those	
relationships	as	malicious,	nefarious,	or	anything	other	than	political.	Gillespie	and	
Kubitschek	point	to	Morrison’s	consistent	work	on	how	“the	results	of	mother-daughter	
relationships	damaged	by	racism	and	poverty”	(29).	Though	attempting	to	criticize	the	
racist	context	in	where	it	occurs,	Gillespie	and	Kubitschek	(both	white),	end	up	
characterizing	Nel	and	Sula	and	their	community	as	a	whole	as	reductively	“broken.”	In	
suggesting	that	Morrison	constructs	“mother-daughter	relationships	damaged	by	racism	
and	poverty”	but	at	the	same	time	positioning	Helene	as	a	middle-class	mother	who	“feeds	
on	her	child,”	Gillespie	et	al.	present	a	racist	reading	with	little	basis	in	actual	historical	
paradigms	of	oppression	(31).	
The	ideological	and	social	context	of	Black	women	in	America	in	the	1940s	makes	it	
quite	difficult	for	either	Eva	Peace	or	Helene	Wright	to	both	be	breadwinners	and	nurturing	
mothers.	As	Kathryn	Bond	Stockton	indicates	in	“Heaven’s	Bottom,”	the	signifier	of	a	
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successful	Black	family	is	measured	“by	the	extent	to	which	they	reverse	Bottom	gender	
and	mime	white	families”	(96).	The	political	grounding	for	this	lies	in	the	philosophy	of	the	
Black	Baptist	Women’s	Movement’s	“respectability.”	Created	post-reconstruction,	the	
movement	emphasized	methods	by	which	Black	women	might	gain	the	same	respect	as	
white	women.	In	Evelyn	Brooks	Higginbotham’s	canonical	text,	Righteous	Discontent:	The	
Women's	Movement	in	the	Black	Baptist	Church:	1880-1920,	the	“religious-political	
message”	takes	from	“biblical	teachings,	the	philosophy	of	racial	self-help,	Victorian	
ideology,	and	the	democratic	principles	of	the	Constitution	of	the	United	States”	(186).	In	
essence,	if	Black	women	were	able	to	attain	the	aspirations	of	the	white	middle-class,	they	
would	assimilate	into	white	American	culture	and	secure	economic	stability	and	bodily	
safety.	The	Black	Baptist	women’s	movement	intended	respectability	as	a	strategy	that	
would	allow	“black	women	to	counter	racist	images	and	structures”	(187).	The	concept	is	
fraught,	for	in	attempting	to	secure	the	(often	physical)	safety	of	Black	women	in	a	racist	
society,	the	movement	“condemned	what	they	perceived	to	be	negative	practices	and	
attitudes	among	their	own	people”	and	preached	“blacks’	conformity	to	the	dominant	
society’s	norms	of	manners	and	morals”	(187).	For	in	essence,	respectability	was	based	
upon	a	principle	denoting	that	the	Black	middle	class	was	effectively	worthier	of	respect	
and	humane	treatment	than	the	working	class.	With	this	in	mind,	Brittney	C.	Cooper	asserts	
that	respectability	politics	emerge	“as	a	reasonable,	though	not	particularly	laudable,	
approach	to	protecting	the	sanctity	of	Black	women’s	bodies”	(15).	So,	while	Helene	
Wright’s	middle-class	aspirations	may	stifle	Nel	and	promote	heteronormativity,	her	
intentions	lie	in	securing	the	safety	of	both	herself	and	her	daughter.	Further,	although	Eva	
and	Hannah’s	easy	sexuality	may	seem	to	be	the	less	repressive	of	the	offered	routes,	both	
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women	also	fulfill	heterosexual	narratives.	
For	the	processes	of	identification	in	Sula,	either	girl	replicating	the	heterosexuality	
of	her	mother	also	results	in	the	halt	of	queer	identification.	As	Ronnie	Scharfman	indicates,	
“the	mother	figure	represents	the	first	external	mirror,	eventually	internalized,	into	which	
a	girl-child	looks	to	discover	her	identity”—but	she	need	not	be	the	last	(89).	The	queer	
girlfriend	demonstrates	the	second	external	mirror.	As	Evelynn	Hammonds	implores	the	
reader	of	the	queer	text	to	look	for	the	void,	so	shall	this	reading	emphasize	the	missing	
space	in	the	novel	(129).	Sula	spans	a	total	of	forty-six	years,	beginning	when	Sula	and	Nel	
are	nine	and	ending	when	Nel	is	fifty-five.	The	first	of	the	gaps	appears	between	1927	and	
1937,	when	Sula	moves	away	from	the	Bottom.	One	can	read	this	“black	hole”	as	a	queer	
one	through	its	bookending	scenes:	Nel’s	wedding	to	Jude	and	Sula’s	return.	Just	as	Nel	and	
Jude	prepare	to	leave	the	wedding	and	consummate	their	marriage,	Sula	departs	the	
Bottom:	“When	she	raised	her	eyes	to	him	for	one	more	look	of	reassurance,	she	saw	
through	the	open	door	a	slim	figure	in	blue,	gliding,	with	just	a	hint	of	a	strut,	down	the	
path	toward	the	road”	(Sula	85).	Pamela	Thurschwell	describes	Nel’s	wedding	as	“a	joyful	
one,	even	if	it	prefigures	a	kind	of	death”	(125).	The	narrative	leaves	off	in	a	ten-year	death,	
revived	only	once	Sula	returns	in	an	effervescent	spring.	Nel’s	wedding	to	Jude	Green	also	
indicates	“Nel’s	halting	movement	toward	whiteness,”	as	characterized	by	Stockton	(102).	
The	text	explains	the	strangeness	of	a	“real	wedding,	in	a	church,	with	a	real	reception	
afterward”	in	the	context	of	the	Bottom	(Sula	80).	Although	it	is	not	difficult	to	read	
heterosexuality	into	a	wedding	between	a	man	and	a	woman,	Nel’s	wedding	signals	the	
climax	of	all	of	Helene’s	white	middle	class	aspirations.	In	Beyond	Respectability,	Brittney	C.	
Cooper	indicates	that	“in	the	American	heteronormative	context,	heterosexual	acts	
	
	 64	
between	consenting	white	parties	have	historically	been	viewed	as	the	most	appropriate”	
manner	in	which	to	engage	sexually	(109).	Therefore,	the	whiteness	of	Nel’s	marriage	
allows	her	to	cross	over	the	threshold	of	the	middle	class,	denying	the	Black	female	
queerness	of	her	childhood.	
The	event	shatters	both	Nel	and	Sula’s	friendship	and	as	well	the	identification	
process.	Kevin	Everod	Quashie	reads	this	in	the	image	of	Sula	walking	out	the	door	at	the	
wedding,	seeing	the	figure	as	a	woman	who	may	be	neither	Nel	nor	Sula	but	a	“third	
woman”	who	“represents	Nel’s	union	with	Sula,”	whose	departure	functions	as	“a	casualty	
of	the	marriage”	(194).	The	woman	is	not	Sula,	nor	is	it	Nel,	but	a	symbol	of	their	dual	self.	
She	is	the	embodiment	of	their	queer	desire	and	identification.	It	is	critical	that	this	third	
woman	leaves	at	the	moment	Nel	severs	identification	with	Sula	by	turning	to	the	
heterosexual	instead.	Nel’s	relationship	with	Jude	does	not	work	as	identification,	for	its	
basis	in	Jude’s	gender	suffering.	As	domestic	labor	at	the	local	hotel	debases	his	
masculinity,	Jude	marries	Nel	to	soothe	his	wounded	ego	by	seeking	sympathy	and	
bolstering	of	his	self.	Marie	Nigro	indicates	that	“with	Nel,	he	would	be	complete…	So	Nel	
joins	with	Jude	to	once	again	merge	herself	with	another”	(728).	Nel	agrees	to	marry	Jude	
by	the	temptation	of	being	seen	as	a	single	person	rather	than	one	half	of	a	set.	But	seduced	
away	from	identification	with	Sula,	she	is	enveloped	entirely	into	a	heterosexual	
relationship	which	promotes	the	subjectivity	of	Jude	rather	than	the	two	together.	Nel	and	
Sula’s	girlhood	double	cannot	persist	“in	the	face	of	social	imaginations,”	like	heterosexual	
relationships	which	“that	intend	to	limit	Black	women’s	right	to	willful	self(ish)ness”	
(Quashie	208).	Marrying	Jude	returns	Nel	to	the	ideologically	mandated	selflessness	that	
Nel	and	Sula’s	identification	surpassed.	Quashie	alleges	that	through	marriage,	“Jude	
	
	 65	
literally	becomes	a	disruption	of	Nel’s	process	of	self-reflection”	(194).	The	black	hole,	to	
speak	to	Hammonds’	theory,	created	by	the	ten	years	of	missing	narrative	after	Nel’s	
wedding	thus	engenders	the	disappearance	of	the	queer.		
On	the	opposite	side	of	the	narrative	gulf,	Sula	returns	to	the	Bottom	in	May	of	1937.	
The	narrator	describes	the	spring	of	Sula’s	return	in	terms	of	the	verdant	summers	of	Nel	
and	Sula’s	youth:	“It	had	a	sheen,	a	glimmering	as	of	green,	rain-soaked	Saturday	nights…	of	
lemon-yellow	afternoons	bright	with	iced	drinks	and	splashes	of	daffodils…	the	river-
smoothness	of	their	voices”	(Sula	94).	Sula	and	Nel	once	again	meet	in	spring,	indicated	the	
supposed	return	of	identification.	Unaware	that	Nel	has	truly	strayed	from	the	path,	Sula	
holds	fast	to	the	identification.	This	reading	helps	to	explain	why	Sula	chooses	to	seduce	
Jude.	If	Sula	still	identifies	with	Nel,	sleeping	with	Jude	is	an	expression	of	Sula’s	desire	for	
Nel,	rather	than	a	betrayal	of	her	best	friend.	In	her	book	Between	Men,	Eve	Sedgwick	
discusses	the	homosocial	and	male	homosexual	desire	expressed	through	triangle	
relationships.	Sedgwick	draws	from	René	Girard,	who	sees	“the	bond	between	two	rivals	in	
an	erotic	triangle	as	being	even	stronger,	more	heavily	determinant	of	actions	and	choices,	
than	anything	in	the	bond	between	either	of	the	lovers	and	the	beloved”	(708).	Fuss	uses	a	
version	of	this	theory	to	re-purpose	triangulation	in	Freud’s	Interpretation	of	Dreams	
(1900)	along	similar	queer	lines.	In	the	story,	Freud	presents	an	example	of	adulterous	
desire	is	played	out	at	a	supper	party,	where	a	butcher	lusts	after	his	plump	wife’s	thin	
friend.	Freud	interprets	the	wife’s	jealousy	of	her	friend	as	a	protracted	desire	for	her	
husband	(Fuss	28).	Fuss	interprets	the	identification/desire	triangle	through	a	queer	lens	
(one	that	Freud	avoids),	“The	drama	of	triangulated	desire	involves	more	than	a	case	of	
heterosexual	jealousy,	wherein	“the	wife’s	identification	with	her	husband’s	desire	opens	
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up	a	space	for	a	forbidden	homoerotic	object-choice”	(29).	Believing	via	identification	that	
she	is	Nel,	Sula	assumes	a	desire	for	Jude.	Jude	becomes	a	mere	vehicle;	“a	convenient	
identificatory	relay	for	a	socially	prohibited	lesbian	desire”	(31).	This	would	explain	why	
Sula	cannot	understand	why	Nel	views	her	actions	as	betrayal.	Sula	cannot	fathom	why	
Jude	couldn’t	be	shared	as	they	had	shared	all	things,	which	is	why	she	“was	ill	prepared	for	
the	possessiveness	of	the	one	person	she	felt	close	to”	(Sula	119).	Rather	than	re-form	
desire	for	Sula,	Nel	rejects	her	a	second	time.	Because	Nel	has	figured	an	identification	with	
Helene	and	her	middle	class,	heterosexual	politics,	she	has	halted	her	identification	with	
Sula.	In	grief	for	Jude,	Nel	shuts	herself	into	the	bathroom	in	her	house	and	waits	“for	the	
oldest	cry.	A	scream	not	for	others,	not	in	sympathy	for	a	burnt	child,	or	a	dead	father,	but	a	
deeply	personal	cry	for	one’s	own	pain”	(108).	But	no	such	cry	arrives,	because	the	cry	is	
not	for	Jude	at	all—it	is	for	the	loss	of	Sula.	The	cry	instead	takes	the	form	of	a	gray	ball,	
“just	to	the	right	of	her,	in	the	air,	just	out	of	view,”	which	follows	her	until	the	end	of	the	
novel—for	as	long	she	denies	identification	with	Sula	(108).	It	seems	that	fulfilling	an	
identification	with	Helene,	or	with	the	white	middle	class,	also	means	a	life	of	isolation.		
Sula	also	fulfills	an	identification	with	her	mother	in	this	scene,	if	a	half-formed	one.	
Hannah	Peace,	though	long	dead,	was	a	woman	who	“could	break	up	a	marriage	before	it	
had	even	become	one”	(Sula	44).	After	the	incident	and	Nel’s	rejection,	Sula	begins	to	
search	for	a	new	identification,	“to	fill	up	the	emptiness,”	as	Marie	Nigro	describes	it	(730).	
Sula	turns	to	the	heterosexual	politics	of	her	maternal	forbearer.	Like	Hannah	once	did,	
Sula	begins	to	sleep	with	the	married	men	of	the	Bottom.	But	when	Hannah	slept	with	
married	men,	the	wives	“never	gossiped,”	taking	her	interest	in	their	husbands	as	a	
compliment	(Sula	44).	When	Sula	sleeps	with	the	Bottom’s	husbands,	the	wives	cast	her	out	
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and	accuse	her	of	doing	“the	unforgivable	thing”	of	sleeping	with	white	men	(112).	
Therefore,	Sula’s	heterosexuality	is	an	inaccurately	replicated	identification	with	her	
mother.	Hannah	was	generous	with	her	love-making,	she	“had	respected	the	ways	of	the	
community”	(Nigro	730).	Sula’s	inability	to	properly	identify	with	Hannah	stems	from	her	
lingering	queer	identification	with	Nel.	Quashie	proposes	that	the	Black	girlfriend	“offers	a	
rare	opportunity	for	that	Black	woman	to	be	selfish”	(190).	Identification	is	the	very	
process	of	being	self-ish,	finding	a	self	in	someone	else	and	keeping	that	self	for	one’s	own.	
Unlike	the	“possessiveness”	of	heterosexual	marriage,	identification	is	for	the	mutual	
benefit	of	both,	the	individual	selfish	desires	of	both	actors	in	the	identification.	Therefore,	
Barbara	Smith’s	suggestion	that	Sula’s	heterosexual	engagements	remain	queer	rings	even	
more	true:	she	“uses	men	for	sex	which	results,	not	in	communion	with	them,	but	in	her	
further	delving	into	self”	(141).	The	pleasure	that	Sula	finds	within	her	heterosexual	
encounters	is	a	selfish	endeavor	for	her	own	enjoyment.	Which	would	explain	Sula’s	failure	
to	replicate	Hannah—who	always	made	sure	her	male	partners	felt	“complete	and	
wonderful	just	as	he	was”	(Sula	43).	Although	Sula	has	sex	with	men,	her	desire	and	
experiences	remain	female-centered,	self-centered,	and	therefore	queer.	
Which	would	explain	why	possessiveness,	when	Sula	finds	it,	results	in	death.	When	
she	first	loses	Nel,	Sula	claims	to	have	“no	intimate	knowledge	of	marriage,	having	lived	in	a	
house	with	women	who	thought	all	men	available”	(Sula	119).	More	so	than	Nel’s	love	for	
Jude,	she	cannot	understand	the	possessiveness	that	bars	Sula	from	the	relationship	and	
from	Nel.	“Possessiveness”	has	the	operative	power	of	switching	a	queer	approach	to	sex	
with	men	to	a	heterosexual	one.	With	the	power	structures	in	place,	Gillespie	and	
Kubitschek	theorize	that	loving	men	“requires	a	giving	of	one’s	self	and	a	‘selfless’	effort	to	
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experience	with	the	other”	(44).	So,	while	Sula’s	undiscerning	sexual	encounters	with	the	
husbands	of	the	Bottom	remain	queer,	the	relationship	she	forms	with	Ajax	becomes	
heterosexual	once	she	begins	to	feel	possessive	of	him.	But	the	relationship	first	reads	as	
queer.	Unlike	Jude,	Susan	Neale	Mayberry	believes	that	Ajax	“is	simply	not	interested	in	
learning	about	the	community	values	of	marriage	and	fidelity”	(528).	Ajax	is	one	of	the	only	
men	in	the	Bottom	secure	in	his	masculinity,	comfortable	in	the	queer	inversions	of	the	
community.	He	is	comfortable	in	the	rootlessness	of	life	in	the	Bottom	because	he	has	no	
designs	on	white	middle	class	upward	mobility:	“Historically,	African	American	men	have	
had	no	land,	held	no	dominion;	moving	is	what	they	do”	(527).	Ajax	likes	Sula	because	of	
her	queer	approach	to	sexuality.	In	their	lovemaking,	Sula	describes	digging	through	the	
“gold”	and	“alabaster”	and	“loam”	of	Ajax’s	face	(Sula	130).	Stockton	interprets	this	as	an	
anal	discourse	on	Sula	and	Ajax’s	sexual	behavior,	“her	rubbing	and	scraping	and	chiseling	
and	swallowing	surely	color	her	active	in	intercourse”	(111).	In	this	queer	version	of	
sexuality,	identification	is	possible.	But	Stockton	reaffirms	that	this	cannot	last	in	the	
context	of	white	heterosexual	ideology,	for	“coupledom	signals	a	‘paradigm	that	just	
doesn’t	work’”	in	the	context	of	Black	economies—no	matter	how	queer	the	heterosexual	
couple	may	be	(98).	As	Nel	became	maternal	figure	to	Jude,	Ajax	suspects	Sula	to	be	
“brilliant,	like	his	mother”	(Sula	128).	Sula	sinks	into	the	role	of	selfless	caretaker,	losing	
the	selfishness	she	cultivated	with	Nel	and	through	her	queered	heterosexual	encounters.	
Which	is	why,	when	Sula	implores	him	to	“Come	on.	Lean	on	me,”	Ajax	runs	for	the	hills	
(133).	Abandoned	for	the	second	time,	Sula	gives	up	on	replacing	Nel	and	accepts	death	as	
the	only	conclusion	to	her	narrative.	
Ajax’s	departure	facilitates	the	final	earthly	meeting	between	Nel	and	Sula	at	Sula’s	
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sickbed.	The	two	are	estranged	but	still	the	meeting	bears	the	mark	of	desire	through	its	
natural	imagery.	While	talking	to	Nel,	Sula	thinks	of	“the	wind	pressing	her	dress	between	
her	legs	as	she	ran	up	the	bank	of	the	river	to	the	four	leaf-locked	trees	and	the	digging	of	
holes	in	the	earth”	(Sula	146).	The	presence	of	nature	and	this	callback	to	their	childhood	
mirroring	indicates	that	identification	persists	between	Nel	and	Sula.	Despite	the	
heterosexual	interventions	and	narrative	gaps,	the	two	girls	remain	linked.	Rita	A.	
Bergenholtz	asserts	that	Nel	decides	to	visit	Sula	in	this	scene	on	the	grounds	of	being	“the	
forgiving	Christian	woman”	(92).	Even	faced	with	Sula’s	death,	Nel	maintains	a	strict	
adherence	to	Helene’s	respectability.	She	alludes	that	the	men	who	have	left	them	would	
have	been	worth	keeping,	to	which	Sula	responds	“They	ain’t	worth	more	than	me”	(Sula	
143).	This	is	both	a	token	of	both	her	commitment	to	self,	but	a	commitment	to	Nel	as	well,	
who	is	after	all	another	dimension	of	Sula.	For	the	meeting	functions	as	a	release	for	Sula,	
who	finds	herself	able	to	sink	into	death	when	Nel	leaves.	Pin-chin	Feng	believes	that	in	
death,	Sula	“engages	in	her	final	step	of	creating	me-ness,”	as	Morrison	paints	Sula	curled	in	
the	fetal	position	in	Eva’s	bed,	in	the	“imagery	of	rebirth”	(88).	More	so	than	me-ness,	it	is	a	
death	of	profound	identification.	Sula	sinks	into	that	“sleep	of	water”	promised	by	Shadrack	
in	her	youth,	“down,	down	until	she	met	a	rain	scent	and	would	know	the	water	was	near,”	
and	remarks,	“Wait’ll	I	tell	Nel”	(Sula	149).	The	presence	of	water	links	Sula	back	to	
Shadrack	and	to	Vashti	Crutcher	Lewis’s	characterization	of	both	as	“water	spirits,”	
wherein	her	death	brings	her	back	“into	the	spirit	world”	(94).	By	hoping	to	share	the	un-
sharable—birth	and	death—Sula	reaches	out	once	more	to	Nel	with	the	most	transcendent	
of	identifications.	Returning	to	the	waters	of	the	river,	Sula	returns	to	the	mirror	play	of	the	
girls’,	to	the	first	heterosexual	intervention	in	the	text	of	Chicken	Little	(Sula	59).	Morrison	
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effectively	constructs	both	a	culmination	of	identification	as	well	as	a	beginning,	implying	
that	Sula	will	be	waiting	for	Nel	on	the	other	side	of	life	to	begin	their	joint	development	
once	more.	
Without	Sula,	the	Bottom	begins	to	collapse	into	itself.	As	the	community’s	most	
vocal	and	vibrant	representation	of	queer	desire	has	been	silenced,	the	town	crumbles.	In	a	
chaotic	scene,	the	novel	culminates	in	a	sort	of	communal	suicide,	fulfilling	the	anal	
discourse	of	the	Bottom’s	name.	On	Shadrack’s	final	National	Suicide	Day	the	inhabitants	of	
the	Bottom	become	the	anal	penetrators	of	the	earth	as	they	dance	into	the	abandoned	
tunnel	beneath	the	river	that	was	meant	to	link	the	Bottom	to	the	rest	of	Medallion:	“They	
didn’t	mean	to	go	down	into	the	lip	of	the	tunnel,	but	in	their	need	to	kill	it	all,	all	of	it…	
they	went	too	deep,	too	far…”	(Sula	161-162).	As	the	tunnel	collapses,	each	and	every	one	
of	the	dancers	die.	Stockton	believes	this	moment	depicts	the	rage	of	the	Bottom’s	
inhabitants	“at	their	own	enforced	downward	mobility”	leading	them	to	“attack	the	tunnel	
that	figures	their	relationship	to	white	employment	promises”	(112).	After	all,	it	is	this	
tunnel	that	promised	a	properly	masculine	vocation	for	the	Bottom’s	Black	men	and	failed	
them.	This	final	queer	penetration	of	the	earth	by	the	people	of	the	Bottom	is	analogous	to	
the	final	collapsing	of	the	Bottom	into	Evelynn	Hammonds’	black	holes	of	Black	lesbian	
desire—a	pleasure	discourse	on	the	agency	of	Black	people	that	has	previously	“gone	
under-analyzed”	(Hammonds	130).	
The	group	suicide	is	also	an	identification	act	on	the	part	of	the	Bottom.	Literary	
critic	Katy	Ryan	believes	that	suicide,	in	Morrison’s	texts,	operates	as	“an	organizational	
axis	around	which	meanings	revolve—a	break	in	textual	time”	(390).	Ryan	also	confers	
that	Black	communities	resist	talking	about	suicide	in	explicit	terms,	because	of	a	
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“reluctance	to	identify	oneself	or	one’s	community	with	victimization,	powerlessness,	
hopelessness”	(391).	Shadrack’s	National	Suicide	Day	emerges	at	the	beginning	of	the	novel	
and	remains	invisible	until	its	final	celebration.	National	Suicide	Day	embodies	the	
“revolutionary	suicide”	that	Ryan	talks	about	because	it	makes	Shadrack’s	private	trauma	
public.	This	suicide	in	particular,	the	final	and	most	successful	of	the	National	Suicide	Days,	
enfolds	itself	into	the	text	as	an	example	of	the	violent	murder	and	incorporation	of	an	
active	identification.	For	as	Stockton	pointed	out,	the	tunnel	epitomizes	the	emasculation	
(and	therefore	queerness)	of	the	Bottom.	The	destruction	of	the	tunnel	along	with	the	
people	that	it	failed,	depicts	Fuss’s	description	of	identification	as	a	“monstrous	
assassination”	in	which	“the	Other	is	murdered	and	orally	incorporated	by	being	entombed	
inside	the	subject”	(34).	In	this	sense,	both	the	victims	of	National	Suicide	Day,	and	the	
Bottom	itself,	become	participants	in	a	large-scale	identification	and	sublimation	process	
by	entombing	themselves	within	the	tunnel.	The	event	illustrates	a	macrocosm	of	Nel	and	
Sula’s	halted	identification,	a	communal	catharsis	of	Sula’s	loss.	
	 After	the	last	National	Suicide	Day,	the	narrative	fades	away	again	twenty-four	
years—plunging	the	Bottom	into	the	black	hole	signified	by	lack	of	narrative.	When	the	tale	
picks	up	again,	it	is	1965	and	“things	were	so	much	better…	or	so	it	seemed”	(Sula	163).	
Although	things	may	seem	“better”	for	Black	Americans	in	the	sixties,	the	Bottom	has	
finished	its	steady	descent	down	into	the	valley,	as	the	white	people	have	moved	up	to	the	
hilltops	(166).	Stockton	indicates	that	the	gesture	to	the	changing	times	at	the	start	of	the	
chapter	“plays	sorrowfully,	ironically	even,	for	the	Civil	Rights	was	a	time	of	symbolic	
reversal”	(112).	For	while	Black	Americans	fought	for	basic	humanity	and	participation	in	
white	America,	they	lost	places	like	the	Bottom,	which	“had	been	a	real	place”	(Sula	166).	
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Unlike	the	opulent	summers	of	Nel	and	Sula’s	youth,	the	Bottom	appears	now	in	fall,	the	
dying	season	illustrating	Nel’s	return	to	Sula.	Nel	happens	upon	Eva	in	the	old	nursing	
home	accidentally,	but	in	doing	so	performs	a	protracted	confrontation	with	Sula.	Eva	
greets	Nel	with	an	immediate	question:	“Tell	me	why	you	killed	that	little	boy”	(168).	Nel	
replies	that	Sula	was	the	one	who	drowned	Chicken	Little,	to	which	Eva	responds,	“You.	
Sula.	What’s	the	difference?”	(168).	This	scene	invokes	Nel	and	Sula’s	first	rejection	of	the	
heterosexual	as	well	as	their	interconnected	identification.	To	recall	Thurschwell’s	reading	
of	Chicken	Little’s	death,	it	constitutes	“the	poles	of	Sula’s	self-loss	and	self-creation”	(121).	
Nel	leaves	the	nursing	home,	and	walks	to	the	cemetery	where	Sula	is	buried,	looks	at	the	
gravestones.	The	meeting	with	Eva	effectively	“collapses	time	and	space,”	calling	back	
across	Nel’s	lifetime	to	her	childhood	as	she	leaves	the	cemetery	(Quashie	206).	
Nel	walks	down	the	road	in	an	October	rain	back	towards	identification	with	her	
girlfriend.	Nel	looks	to	the	tops	of	the	trees,	to	nature	and	to	Sula,	and	realizes	that	“All	that	
time,	I	thought	I	was	missing	Jude,”	crying	“O	Lord,	Sula…	girl,	girl,	girlgirlgirl”	(Sula	174).	
The	cry	has	hovered	just	out	of	sight	in	the	form	of	that	ugly	grey	ball	since	Nel	failed	to	cry	
twenty-four	years	prior,	waiting	to	be	released.	Michelle	Pessoni	argues	that	“it	takes	a	long	
time	for	Nel	to	realize	Sula	is	indeed	the	missing	center,”	potentially	because	she	has	been	
imprisoned	in	the	grey	ball,	floating	at	the	edge	of	Nel’s	perception	(442).	Just	before	she	
cries,	“a	soft	ball	of	fur	broke	and	scattered	like	dandelion	spores	in	the	breeze,”	releasing	
her	identification	with	Sula	from	where	it	has	been	bound	for	twenty-five	years	(Sula	174).	
The	cry	also	functions	as	an	identification	ritual.	Thurschwell	reads	Nel’s	cry	through	
Freud’s	“Mourning	and	Melancholia”	(1917),	in	which	a	“patient	in	the	grip	of	
melancholia…	recognizes	that	he	has	lost	something,	or	someone,	but	is	not	certain	what	he	
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has	lost,	in	part	because	of	his	ambivalence”	(123).	Thurschwell	believes	that	Nel’s	
heterosexual	attachments	to	Jude	have	masked	her	love	for	Sula.	To	push	this	reading	
further	into	terms	of	identification,	Fuss	also	invokes	“Mourning	and	Melancholia,”	which	
expresses	that	“identification	works	as	a	form	of	elegy,	remembering	and	commemorating	
the	lost	object	by	ritually	incorporating	it	in	serial	replacements…	the	subject	paradoxically	
destroys	the	love	object	only	in	order	better	to	preserve	it”	(38).	Nel’s	cry	re-incorporates	
her	lost	love	object,	her	sister,	her	other:	Sula.	It	is	a	cry	with	no	bottom	and	no	top,	
inherently	upside	down	and	inverse,	like	the	queer	Bottom.	Feng	believes	that	it	has	the	
queering	effect	of	releasing	“her	from	the	mechanism	of	repression”	(101).	This	allows	Nel	
to	make	her	way	back	to	Sula	and	thus	back	to	herself.	For	Quashie,	the	relationship	
between	Black	girlfriends	is	an	“ongoing	unsettling	process,”	one	that	leads	“toward	her	
embrace	of	her	own	volatile	self”	(197).	In	some	ways,	this	scene	is	a	return	to	the	
identification	processes	of	Nel	and	Sula.	In	a	separate	sense,	it	is	the	beginning	of	Nel’s	
development.	Perhaps	if	there	were	to	be	a	second	novel,	it	would	be	called	Nel.	
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Conclusion:	“What	Transpired	Among	the	Women”	
“Together,	we	spoke	a	language	that	was,	in	tone	and	content,	structure	and	
style,	different	from	the	way	either	of	us	spoke	with	men	or	the	way	men,	we	
thought	spoke	with	each	other,	different	in	ways	that	went	beyond	the	
length	of	our	friendship.”	
Louise	Bernikow,	Among	Woman	
	
In	the	original	German	definition,	the	bildungsroman	genre	is	meant	to	demonstrate	
the	linear	development	of	a	young	protagonist	as	he	ascends	into	adulthood.	Pin-chia	Feng	
notes	in	her	article,	“We	Was	Girls	Together,”	that	such	a	rendering	reflects	the	
“quintessential	western	bourgeois	(male)”	perspective	(40).	The	white	European	and	
American	versions	of	the	bildungsroman	perpetuate	the	myth	of	the	independent	agent	on	
a	journey	to	“identity.”	By	the	traditional	criterion,	Sylvia	Plath’s	The	Bell	Jar	and	Toni	
Morrison’s	Sula	both	“fail”	to	deliver	their	protagonists	into	development.	In	order	for	the	
“coming	of	age	tale”	or	bildungsroman	to	survive	as	a	genre,	the	definition	must	be	
expanded.	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	prove	that	a	protagonist’s	development	necessarily	occurs	
in	the	context	of	their	community,	family,	and	relationships.	The	coming	of	age	tale	which	
abides	by	the	reductive	perception	of	autonomy	and	“identity”	outlined	in	the	
bildungsroman	form	cannot	authentically	portray	reality.	Diana	Fuss’s	“identification,”	
diagrammed	in	Identification	Papers	(1995),	is	a	more	useful	psychoanalytic	tool	for	
reading	self-development.	Not	only	is	identification	a	non-linear	act	of	necessary	
“repetition	and	remembrance,”	but	it	also	uncovers	the	fundamental	instability	of	selfhood	
in	being	“only	ever	partially	secure	and	never	complete”	(34).	A	genre	about	“self”	such	as	
the	bildungsroman	does,	cannot	purport	such	rigid	definitions	of	human	behavior.	Thus,	
reimagining	the	bildungsroman	term	along	the	lines	of	identification	pushes	the	form	to	a	
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version	which	can	support	all	narratives—not	just	the	white	and	male.	Both	The	Bell	Jar	
and	Sula	move	the	genre	away	from	individualist	masculine	leanings	of	the	white	male	
bildungsroman	mode.	
Toni	Morrison	and	Sylvia	Plath	may	be	contemporaries	by	some	definitions,	but	
they	occupy	greatly	different	social,	ideological,	and	theoretical	spaces.	Sula	was	published	
just	two	years	after	the	American	release	of	The	Bell	Jar.	Sula	begins	in	1920	and	ends	in	
1965,	locating	Esther’s	1953	plotline	in	one	of	the	invisible	years	after	Sula’s	death	and	
before	the	end	of	the	novel.	In	The	Bell	Jar,	Esther’s	developmental	arc	is	structured	along	a	
violent	reckoning	of	her	sexual	trauma.	The	intrusion	of	heterosexual	violence	interrupts	
her	development,	which	only	continues	once	she	has	destroyed	and	incorporated	the	
ambivalent	identification	with	her	abuser,	per	Fuss’s	description	of	“the	violence	at	the	
heart	of	identification”	(34).	Serially	attempting	suicide,	Esther	regresses	to	a	semiotic	state	
of	childhood,	which	permits	her	metaphorical	rebirth	into	the	symbolic	order	of	human	
language.	Once	rebirthed	in	the	white,	female	space	of	the	private	hospital,	Esther	
constructs	queer	identifications	with	women	and	begins	her	proper	development.	In	Sula,	
Nel	and	Sula	follow	a	dual	development	of	interdependent	identification	in	the	queer	
context	of	the	Bottom,	their	Black	community	which	exists	outside	of	white	American	
ideology.	Nel	and	Sula’s	friendship	exemplifies	Fuss’s	point	that	Freud’s	“homosociality	is	
never	very	far	from	the	homosexuality	it	claims	to	‘repress’”	(45).	The	girls’	relationship,	
identification,	and	identification	all	break	apart	when	white	paradigms	of	heterosexual	
ideology	draw	Nel	into	marriage	with	a	man,	Jude	Green.	The	developmental	plot	is	halted	
for	Sula	until	her	death	and	for	Nel	until	she	acknowledges	that	Sula	was	always	the	one	
she	loved,	not	her	husband.	The	plotlines	of	both	novels	regularly	resist	normative	
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trajectories;	doubling	back	on	themselves,	leaving	off	completely,	and	concluding	without	
much	certainty.	Catherine	Belsey,	in	Critical	Practice,	discusses	how	the	“classic	realist”	
narrative	of	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries	emphasizes	ideological	“closure,”	
which	“ensures	the	reinstatement	of	order,	sometimes	a	new	order,	sometimes	the	old	
restored,	but	always	intelligible	because	familiar”	(75).	Belsey	argues	that	“closure”	is	
merely	a	performance	of	ideological	conscription.	Novels	which	problematize	ideology,	like	
The	Bell	Jar	(to	an	extent)	and	Sula,	culminate	in	open	endings.	The	irregular	composition	
of	The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	therefore	should	place	these	novels	as	bildungsromans	more	
authentic	and	culturally	significant	than	the	original	German	texts.	
Sula	questions	compulsions	of	Black	adherence	to	white	American	cultural	projects	
and	pushes	Black	women’s	queer	love	forward	by	highlighting	female	relationships	and	
criticizing	heterosexual	ones.	The	Bell	Jar	engages	a	proto-feminist	discourse	on	white	
women’s	obedience	to	heterosexual	norms	of	fifties	but	fails	to	effectively	disparage	or	
even	begin	to	interrogate	America’s,	Esther’s,	and	the	text’s	pervasive	white	supremacy.	
These	ideologies	reflect	not	necessarily	just	what	the	authors	consciously	wrote	into	the	
text,	but	more	so	the	unconscious	cultural	inscriptions	of	the	text.	Valerie	Smith,	in	“Black	
Feminist	Theory	and	the	Representation	of	the	‘Other’,”	defines	Black	feminist	literary	
theory	as	a	way	of	reading	inscriptions	of	race	(particularly	but	not	exclusively	blackness),	
gender	(particularly	but	not	exclusively	womanhood),	and	class”	that	are	already	always	
present	in	all	“modes	of	cultural	expression”	(370).	Smith’s	definition	is	useful	insofar	that	
it	permits	readers	of	any	positionality	to	engage	culturally	and	socially	nuanced	readings	of	
texts,	but	because	it	surpasses	the	problem	of	authorial	intent.	Though	Esther,	Nel,	and	Sula	
all	identify	as	heterosexual,	engage	in	sex	with	men,	and	rarely	if	at	all	consider	the	
	
	 77	
possibility	of	desiring	women,	each	is	only	able	to	form	mutually	beneficial	identifications	
with	other	women.	Queerness	need	not	be	sexually	explicit	in	the	text,	it	is	inscribed	by	the	
divisive	heterosexual	ideology	depicted	in	both.	Each	protagonist	learns	the	inadequacy	of	
heterosexual	intimacy	and	its	consistent	interruption	of	identification-based	development.	
White	heterosexual	ideology	of	the	American	midcentury	requires	each	character	to	
assume	desires	for	men,	but	also	creating	a	breach	between	men	and	women	in	both	the	
white	genteel	spaces	of	New	England	and	Black	working-class	communities	of	rural	Ohio.	
The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula	depict	racially	enclosed	spaces:	the	Bottom	subverts	“Black”	as	
the	unmarked	category	rather	than	white,	while	Esther’s	private	hospital	perpetuates	a	
white	supremacist	ideal	by	its	exclusion	of	racial	others.	The	Black	inhabitants	of	the	
barred	from	inclusion	in	white	American	heterosexual	ideology	by	inverse	economic	
relations	of	the	Black	family	wherein	the	wife	can	find	work,	but	the	husband	cannot.	As	
Katherine	Bond	Stockton	suggests	in	“Heaven’s	Bottom,”	that	accord	with	white	paradigms	
permits	“upward	mobility”	that	inevitably	“proves	theologically	and	sexually	bankrupt,	but	
downward	mobility	spells	economic	suicide	for	marginalized	people”	(113).	The	Black	
inhabitants	of	the	Bottom	are	thus	required	both	economically	and	by	white	American	
ideology	to	pursue	upward	mobility,	but	unable	to	do	so	without	sacrificing	Blackness.	The	
Bottom	is	a	site	of	contradictory	discourses,	a	town	slowly	collapsing	in	on	itself.	Nel	and	
Sula	embody	the	alternative,	a	“something	else	to	be:”	a	relationship	which	exists	outside	of	
white	heterosexual	American	ideology,	the	Black	girlfriend	(Sula	52).	The	white	feminine	
space	of	the	private	hospital	in	The	Bell	Jar	allows	Esther	to	escape	heterosexual	ideology,	
but	also	fosters	her	preexisting	loyalty	to	white	supremacist	beliefs	and	actions.	Esther’s	
subjectivity	as	a	white	woman	relies	on	her	precarious	position	in	the	white	American	
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social	hierarchy,	perceived	to	be	“below”	white	men	but	believing	herself	“above”	people	of	
color.	Thus,	only	white	women	can	offer	the	possibility	of	identification	for	Esther.	While	
Nicholas	Donofrio	asserts	she	is	“not	lacking	for	female	role	models,”	Esther	cannot	attach	
herself	to	any	of	the	white	women	she	encounters	prior	to	the	private	hospital	(244).	In	
order	to	develop	identification	and	heal	from	sexual	trauma,	Esther	must	find	her	place	
within	the	male	symbol	order	by	first	returning	to	the	semiotic	in	her	suicide	attempts.	The	
Bell	Jar	thus	rejects	heterosexual	discourse	but	promotes	white	nationalism.	Free	of	both	
men	and	racial	others	in	the	private	hospital,	Esther	is	free	to	pursue	identification	with	
Joan,	her	white,	wealthy,	lesbian	identified	double.	
Fulfillment	of	the	queer	narrative	through	death	operates	as	a	critical	determinant	
in	the	theoretical	framework	of	both	novels.	Esther’s	serial	unsuccessful	suicide	attempts	
represent	the	murderous	side	of	identification:	Fuss’s	“monstrous	assassination”	of	the	
other	(34).	Sula’s	death	signifies	an	annihilation	of	the	heterosexual	and	the	sublimation	of	
the	queer—“Wait’ll	I	tell	Nel”	(Sula	149).	Additionally,	Esther’s	last	suicide	attempt	and	
Sula’s	death	are	both	figured	in	terms	of	sleep	and	water.	Sula	describes	her	death	as	a	
feeling	of	sinking	“down	until	she	met	a	rain	scent…	Who	was	it	that	had	promised	her	a	
sleep	of	water	always?”	(149).	Esther’s	“death”	personifies	as	the	ocean:	“Then,	at	the	rim	
of	vision,	it	gathered	itself,	and	in	one	sweeping	tide,	rushed	me	to	sleep”	(Plath	169).	
Watery	death	is	significant	in	both	scenes	as	each	connotes	a	rebirth.	Sula	returns	to	
identification	with	Nel	in	death	while	Esther	emerges	on	the	other	side	of	death	in	rebirth,	
reading	to	meet	her	double.	Both	novels	also	end	in	cemeteries	and	with	an	invocation	of	
the	semiotic.	At	the	end	of	Sula,	Nel	visits	Sula’s	grave	and	mourns	lost	relationship	for	the	
first	time	since	it	ended	with	“a	fine	cry—loud	and	long,”	lamenting:	“We	was	girls	
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together”	(174).	This	moment	has	the	same	critical	function	as	Sula’s	death,	heralding	the	
reinstatement	of	identification	and	a	new	beginning	for	Nel’s	development.	Similarly,	The	
Bell	Jar	ends	in	the	graveyard	at	her	double’s	burial.	Esther’s	relationship	with	Joan	is	much	
less	spiritually	and	emotionally	enduring	than	Nel	and	Sula’s	by	all	value	judgements.	So	
instead	of	crying	for	Joan,	Esther	does	not	cry	out,	she	turns	inward	and	listens	to	her	body	
speak,	assuring	her	of	its	persistence:	“I	am,	I	am,	I	am”	(Plath	243).	Preceding	her	release	
from	the	hospital	in	the	last	passages,	this	scene	affirms	the	identification	of	Esther	and	
Joan	as	the	only	queer	climax	available	in	the	ideological	context	of	the	novel.	
The	Bell	Jar	and	Sula,	though	different	in	social	context	and	ideology,	engage	similar	
theoretical	discourses	to	explain	the	development	of	their	protagonists.	Esther,	Nel,	and	
Sula’s	social	positionalities	restrict	personal	agency	(Nel	and	Sula’s	more	than	Esther’s),	
prohibiting	the	possibility	of	a	classical	bildungsroman	plot.	Both	are	novels	of	pre-
development	and	broken	development,	wherein	coming	of	age	is	only	possible	through	
identification	with	a	queer	double.	Positioning	queerness	and	double	as	the	most	essential	
feature	of	development	de-centers	the	bildungsroman	from	its	traditional	definition	of	
solitary	growth.	Louise	Bernikow’s	text	Among	Women	(1980)	chronicles	literary	meetings	
of	women—author	to	author,	character	to	character,	reader	to	text.	According	to	the	
history	of	women’s	representation	in	literature,	when	“a	man	walks	out	of	a	room,	leaving	
two	women	behind,”	the	two	“will	argue.	Or	nothing	will	happen”	(3).	Bernikow	contests	
this	assertion	by	analyzing	hundreds	of	texts	which	exemplify	exactly	what	does	happen	
when	two	women	are	left	alone	in	a	room.	In	the	final	chapter,	Bernikow	struggles	through	
a	reading	of	women	positioned	against	one	another	in	the	dichotomy	of	“light”	and	“dark,”	
both	racially	and	morally.	In	summation,	she	asks	the	reader	to	consider	oppositions	as	
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“made	and	not	given,	constructed	and	not	chemical	or	theological,”	claiming	that	when	this	
is	done,	dark	and	light	“can	be	seen	differently	and	changed”	(264).	Her	perspective	is	well-
meaning	and	empathetic,	but	outdated,	seeking	to	bring	women	together	on	the	topic	of	
being	women	across	racial	boundaries.	Bernikow	employs	a	race-blind	philosophy,	rather	
than	a	race	conscious	one.	Elizabeth	V.	Spelman,	in	“The	Ampersand	Problem”	alleges	that	
“We	cannot	hope	to	understand	the	meaning	of	a	person’s	experiences,	including	her	
experiences	of	oppression,	without	first	thinking	of	her	as	embodied,	and	second	thinking	
about	the	particular	meanings	assigned	to	that	embodiment”	(84).	Spelman’s	article	is	also	
outdated,	but	her	philosophy	is	correct.	Examining	the	ideology	which	has	influenced	the	
living	perspectives	of	Black	women	and	also	white	women	is	critical	to	understanding	their	
texts.	Nel	and	Sula’s	development	is	fundamentally	structured	around	their	Black	
womanhood,	just	as	Esther’s	is	entirely	dependent	on	her	position	as	an	upwardly	mobile	
white	woman.	Reading	identification	into	these	texts,	reading	queerness	into	these	texts,	
reading	trauma,	reading	family,	and	reading	community	into	these	texts,	relies	on	
comprehensive	consideration	of	the	ideology	surrounding	these	texts.	Such	a	reading	is	
paramount.	De-centering	the	bildungsroman	along	the	lines	of	identification	as	to	include	a	
wider	amount	of	narratives	is	possible	only	with	deference	to	ideology.	
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